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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of the Dissertation:  Interrelations between dry bulk forward freight 
agreements and the dry bulk spot market. 
 
 
Degree:   Master of Science 
 
 
Dry bulk forward freight agreements (FFAs) are trading dry bulk indices, and thus have 
an impact on the dry bulk spot market.  
 
The fast growing trade of FFAs should have a larger impact on the spot market, yet no 
study has estimated how the spot market will be affected by the growing FFA trade.  
 
To evaluate the effect of the increase of FFA deals, the current interrelations should be 
first well defined. Consequently, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the 
interrelations between dry bulk forward freight agreements (FFAs) and the dry bulk spot 
market. 
 
A brief review of the literature assists to concentrate on the four major aspects of the 
interrelations between FFAs and the spot market. The four major aspects of the 
interrelations are then investigated with numerous tools and approaches imported from 
economics, management or marketing.  
iii 
 Also, the concept and practices of FFAs are examined along with a study of the FFA 
market: its developments, its participants and its state of pure and perfect competition.  
 
The study concludes with the major findings of the analysis which confirm the existence 
of multiple and complex interrelations between dry bulk forward freight agreements and 
the dry bulk spot market. Hence, the impact of a growing FFA can be extrapolated. 
 
 
 
Key words:  BDI, dry bulk FFA, forecast, supply and demand of FFAs, price 
distortion, BDI representativeness.  
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction 
 
The shipping industry is capital intensive. Its largest source of finance is debt through 
bank loans. Some shipowning companies have diversified the origin of funds by going 
public. Some of them have been really successful to attract a large amount of funds 
through stock exchanges because investors were attracted by the booming revenue of 
some shipping sectors such as dry bulk cargo. 
 
In finance, it is recognised that high yield often goes along with high risk. The shipping 
industry is not an exception. Risk management principles have been adapted to shipping 
and make it possible to identify three primary areas of risks (Gray, 1990, p. 23): market 
risk, financial risk and bunker risk. The first is by far the most damaging for the shipping 
industry.  
 
A modern financial tool called the forward freight agreement (FFA) has been created to 
manage freight risk. Shipping companies have increased their use of FFAs in order to 
achieve a sustainable growth by managing freight risk and attract more funds.  
 
If one was asked to give the fastest growing shipping market in the world between 2002 
and 2005, few would be able to mention screen traded FFA (Imarex, 2007c). Even 
though, FFAs are still expected to grow, they are still perceived at the margin of the 
shipping industry. Since FFA is related to its underlying spot market, it is important to 
understand clearly the impact of FFA on the spot market. However, the consequences of 
a growing FFA market on the spot market are nowadays uncertain.  
 
1 
FFAs represent an important opportunity offered to operators in shipping to manage 
their freight risks. However, FFAs are a threat since a growing FFA market will have an 
unclear impact on the spot market. An investigation of this impact will permit spot 
market participants to anticipate it and therefore will reduce part of the uncertainty in the 
spot market.  
 
FFAs can trade both dry and wet bulk freight; however, their characteristics are 
completely different. Therefore, this dissertation will focus only on the largest FFA 
market with presumably the largest impact on its spot market i.e. dry bulk FFA1. To 
assess the impact of the growing trade of FFAs on its underlying market, it is necessary 
first to understand the current interrelations between the spot and FFA market. That is 
the reason why this dissertation will undertake the analysis of the interrelations between 
the dry bulk FFAs and the dry bulk spot market.  
 
This paper has not been written applying a pre-established methodology but one has 
been created for the purpose of this dissertation as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Selection 
of 
aspects Aspects with 
new prospective
Overlooked 
aspects
 
     Literature 
Review 
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
 
Selection 
of topic 
 
 
Analysis 
Figure 1: Methodology flow 
Source: Author. 
 
                                                 
1 As per Imarex (2007b), dry bulk derivatives amounted 60% in 2006. 
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The literature review will be carried out to emphasize on the progression of the research 
on the interrelations between the two markets. The objective is to avoid redundancy and 
to contribute to the research on FFAs. So, four major aspects of the interrelations of 
FFAs on the spot market have been identified and selected for further analysis because 
of their potential negative impact on the spot market or to provide a better understanding 
with an alternate prospective on some “hot” issue of the research. 
 
The four aspects which have been selected are: 
1. The impact on the Baltic indices of the growing influence of FFA traders. 
2. The empirical limitation of the forecasting capabilities. 
3. FFA pricing thanks to supply and demand of FFAs. 
4. Possible price distortion of the spot prices by FFA traders. 
 
Then, the four selected aspects will be analysed as per Figure 2. 
 
 
        
       Interrelations 
analysis 
FFA 
    Market 
analysis 
Price 
distortion 
analysis 
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
    Analysis 
 
Figure 2: Analysis flow 
Source: Author. 
 
To complete the analysis of the selected four aspects, this dissertation will be organised 
as follow: Chapter 2 will review the literature and selects the four major aspects of the 
interrelations between the dry bulk FFAs and the dry bulk spot market. Chapter 3 will 
analyse FFA markets. Chapter 4 will start the investigation of three out of the four 
selected aspects of the interrelations between dry bulk FFAs and the dry bulk spot 
3 
market. Chapter 5 will study the potential price distortion using seasonality analysis. 
Chapter 6 will conclude by summarising the findings of this research and consider some 
further possible research.  
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Chapter 2 -  Review of the literature on freight derivatives and key elements of 
the methodology 
 
This dissertation will focus on the interrelations between dry bulk FFAs and the dry bulk 
spot market. Some research has already touched some aspects. Besides, it is hard to be 
exhaustive in the work realised during the two last decades by many researchers. It is 
necessary to review the literature on freight derivatives (part  2.1). The objective is to 
avoid redundancy and to contribute to the research on FFAs. Then, some key elements 
of the methodology will be presented (part  2.2).  
 
2.1 Literature review 
Although all research is interrelated, for the sake of simplicity, the literature review will 
be organised in four parts representing four elements of the research. 
 
2.1.1  Impact of indices changes on freight derivatives 
Cullinane et al. reported that the exclusion of all Handysize trades from the BFI in 
November 1993 has not altered its behaviour and created “only a very small deviation” 
(Cullinane et al., 1999, pp. 15-39).  
 
However, models used in Cullinane (1992, pp. 91-114) and Cullinane et al. (1999, pp. 
15-39) are “not capable in capturing both the short-run dynamics and the long-run 
relationships between the variables” (Batchelor et al., 2007, p. 102). Therefore, 
Kavussanos and Nomikos (2003, p. 225) have discovered that “forecasts become more 
accurate as a result of the introduction of time-charter routes; however, their accuracy 
deteriorates following the exclusion of handysize routes from the index”.  
5 
 On the one hand, it has been proven that changes of the indices have consequences on 
the FFA trade. On the other hand, no research has focused on the constraints generated 
by FFA trade on the Baltic dry bulk indices. Section  4.1 will analyse the latest 
segmentation of the indices to study if it complies with the representativeness objective 
or fulfils some needs of the index users i.e. FFA traders. 
 
2.1.2 Forecasting of the spot market using FFAs 
First of all, research on forecasting has developed many interrelated aspects such as the 
price discovery function, unbiasedness hypothesis or the lead-lag effect between 
derivatives and spot prices.  
 
The freight derivatives market is relatively thin and recent. Researchers have focused 
progressively on commodity, financial, equity and then freight derivatives. The previous 
investigations still nowadays influence freight derivatives research. 
 
2.1.2.1 Forecasting of the spot prices using derivatives 
According to Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004, pp. 2017-2018) and Kavussanos, Visvikis 
and Batchelor (2004, pp. 274-275), “the theory governing the relationship between spot 
and derivatives prices of continuously storable commodities was developed by Working 
(1970) amongst others”.  
 
In 1988, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) published an article on the arbitrage 
strategies and pointed out the importance of cost-of-carry 2 . Thus, the fundamental 
                                                 
2 Cost-of-carry is the sum of costs related with the purchase of “the asset at the spot price and storing it for 
subsequent sale at the forward price” (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988) in other words, costs related to 
the purchase and storage of one asset upto it resale i.e. interests, inventory costs, opportunity costs… 
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difference between the storable or non-storable nature of an underlying commodity in 
the relation between its spot and its derivatives prices has been highlighted. The 
“interdependence between spot and FFA prices may not be as strong [for freight 
derivatives] as it is for storable commodities [such as agricultural commodities]” 
(Kavussanos et al., 2004, pp. 274-275). 
 
Then, authors researching on freight derivatives focused on the works on financial 
derivatives. Kavussanos and Nomikos (2003, p. 206) adapted their methodology from 
the findings of Stoll and Whaley (1990) reporting that futures of S&P-500 and Major 
Market Index contracts lead the underlying spot market. Comparable methods were 
applied and results were found by Wahab and Lashgari (1990) for FTSE-100 and S&P-
500, by Hung and Zhang (1995) for interest rate futures and by Tse (1995) for Nikkei 
Stock index. 
 
Further to the above research focusing on the pricing relation between derivatives and its 
underlying market, published articles started to consider the freight derivatives. 
 
2.1.2.2 Forecasting of the BFI using BIFFEX 
Cullinane (1992) and Cullinane et al. (1999) have succeeded in forecasting the spot 
freight rates (BFI) with the BIFFEX using simplier unvariate ARIMA models. Also, 
Chang and Chang (1996, p. 113) have “concluded that BIFFEX prices can predict 
movements of the dry bulk shipping market (BFI) up to six months at the maximum 
prior to the real happenings in the physical market with an accuracy ranging from 90% 
in the case of one-month lag to 23% in the case of six-months lag.” Kavussanos and 
Nomikos confirmed that “spot and futures prices stand in a long-run relationship” 
7 
(Kavussanos & Nomikos, 2003, p. 226) but “futures prices tend to discover new 
information more rapidly than spot prices3” (Kavussanos & Nomikos, 2003, p. 205). 
 
2.1.2.3 Forecasting of some routes of BDI using FFA 
Moving to FFAs, Alizadeh and Nomikos (2003) argued that “FFAs do not seem to be 
very accurate in revealing the direction of future freight rates”. FFAs can predict the 
direction of the spot market only between 46% and 74% and its forecasting accuracy 
declines as maturity increases (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2003).  
 
However, new findings contradict the previous. FFAs (routes P1, P1A, P2 and P2A) can 
forecast the spot prices up to two months and be extended up to three months for P2 and 
P2A (Kavussanos, Visvikis & Menachof, 2004, p. 241). It has confirmed the findings of 
Kavussanos and Nomikos (1999, pp. 353-376) for one-month and two-month BIFFEX, 
of Haigh (2000, pp. 545-571) for three-month BIFFEX, of Kavussanos and Visvikis 
(2006, pp. 245-246) but nuanced the allegations of Kavussanos et al. (2001) that “FFA 
prices are unbiased predictors of the realised spot prices for all investigated routes”.  
 
Later on Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004, p. 2033) estimated that FFA was ahead of the 
spot market with “approximately 25-30 days in route P1, and 15-20 days for the rest of 
the routes (P1A, P2 and P2A)” with a “correlation coefficients between FFA and spot 
rates in each of the routes: 0.965, 0.972, 0.986, and 0.985 (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004, 
p. 2021)”. 
                                                 
3 ”Fleming et al. (1996) introduce what they call the trading cost hypothesis, which predicts that the 
market with the lowest overall trading costs will react most quickly to new information and thus, exhibit 
price leadership. They suggest that the lead–lag relationship should change when it becomes more costly 
or less costly for traders to exploit the information in the spot market (Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2004, p. 
2035)” 
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 Then, scholars compared the forecasting performance of each models. The bivariate 
VECM model is argued in the literature to be the most appropriate model up to 20 days 
ahead (Batchelor et al., 2003; Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2006, pp. 243-244; Batchelor et 
al., 2007, p. 102). For extended forecast, simple univariate ARIMA models are the most 
suitable models (Batchelor et al., 2007, p. 102).  
 
The latest research of Batchelor et al. (2007, p. 113) mentioned that “models (ARIMA; 
VAR; VECM and s-VECM) suggest that forward rates adjust more strongly than spot 
rates to close the gap between spot and forward rates” and “do help predict spot rates” 
(Batchelor et al., 2007, p. 113). 
 
2.1.2.4 Possible extension of research 
Previously mentioned studies, successful in the realisation of a forecast, have been 
concentrated on the four most traded routes of the BPI. Their methodology could be 
extended to other routes. In spite of the fact that published FFA quoted prices belong to 
the FFABA and the association is not willing to provide the data to any non member, 
data could have been compiled manually from the specialised press. However, the 
publication of the data is stopped when markets become illiquid, which will lead to lack 
of consistency of the analysed data.  
 
Even though authors always mentioned some limitations of their own model of forecast, 
no extensive study exists why the forecasting capabilities are limited. Therefore, part  4.2 
of this dissertation will investigate why the forecasting capabilities of the forward freight 
agreements are empirically limited. 
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2.1.3 Pricing of FFAs 
Several elements of the pricing of freight derivatives have been developed like FFA 
price modelling (Kavussanos, 2002, pp. 661–692) (Kavussanos et al, 2004, pp. 241–266), 
(Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004, pp. 2015–2049) or options pricing (Koekebakker et al, 
2007). No price models will be built in this dissertation for the pricing of FFAs. 
However, supply and demand of FFAs will be related to the perceived freight risk from 
the spot market (part  4.3) offering another prospective on the research on FFA pricing.  
 
2.1.4 Impact of FFA trade on the spot market 
According to Kavussanos and Visvikis’ study (2004, p. 2046), “FFA market volatility 
spills information to spot market volatility in route P1. In route P1A the results indicate 
no volatility spillovers in either market. In routes P2 and P2A, (…) the FFA market 
plays a leading role in incorporating new information”. 
 
In addition, research using a methodology developed by Glosten et al. (1993, pp. 1779–
1801) on the impact of FFA on traded routes P1, P1A, P2 and P2A concluded that it has 
“improved the quality and speed of information flowing in routes P1, P1A and P2 [but 
not for P2A]” (Kavussanos et al., 2004, pp. 273–296), “in accordance with the results in 
most futures markets” (Kavussanos et al., 2004, pp. 273–296) such as studies in the 
electricity derivatives markets by Eydeland and Geman (1998), by Geman and Vasicek 
(2001), and by Besembinder and Lemmon (2002).  
 
Kavussanos et al. “conjecture that by attracting more, and possibly better informed, 
participants into the market, FFA trading has assisted the incorporation of information 
into spot prices to be quicker (Kavussanos et al, 2004, p. 275)”.  
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No research has quantified the impact of the settlement price calculation method of FFA 
on the spot price. A seasonality analysis would permit to assess if any price distortions 
are “visible” in the spot market. 
 
2.2 Key elements of the methodology 
As mentioned in the introduction, the four major aspects of the interrelations of FFAs on 
the spot market have been identified because of their potential negative impact on the 
spot market or to provide a better understanding with an alternate prospective on some 
“hot” issues of the research. The alternate prospective will be achieved thanks to the four 
below mentioned elements. 
 
Firstly, the analysis is applicable to all sub-routes and indices except for one more 
specific research in  0 where the focus is not on the major FFA traded routes (P1, P1A, 
P2, and P2A) as the majority of the research but on the BCI and its routes.  
 
Secondly, as a multidisciplinary dissertation, some analytic tools have been imported 
from other disciplines such as economics, management and marketing.  
 
Thirdly, as far as possible, the most precise and complete data has been used. For 
instance, daily prices have been preferred instead of weekly or monthly, from the 
inception of the index instead of shorter periods. In addition, when achievable, data in 
the literature quoting other sources have been avoided to focus on first hand information. 
That is the reason why index data is from the Baltic Exchange and information from 
screen traded FFA are from the exchanges.  
 
Fourthly, it attempts to balance sources and prospective from academic researchers and 
practitioners. 
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Chapter 3 -  Analysis of Freight Forward Agreements markets 
In order to analyse the relations between FFAs and the spot market, it is necessary to 
properly understand the FFAs. So, this chapter will be organised to reply to the 
questions compiled in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Organisation of the chapter related to key questions on FFAs  
Question Section title Part 
What are FFAs? Concept and practices of FFAs.  3.1
What is the size of the FFA 
market? 
Developments of a growing market but still 
illiquid. 
 3.2
Who is trading FFAs? Concentric progression of market 
participants. 
 3.3
Are FFAs efficient?  
Is the FFA market in a state of 
pure and perfect competition?  
Assessment of FFA market efficiency 
thanks to an analysis of the competition.  
 3.4
Source: Author. 
 
3.1 Concept and practices of FFA 
This section will answer “What are FFAs?” Firstly, several definitions and the basic 
principle will be contemplated. Secondly, the two-steps mechanics of FFAs will be 
explained. Thirdly, the duality of the FFA market will be dealt with. Fourth, the index of 
the FFA prices will be presented.  
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3.1.1 Definition and basic principle 
As per the Baltic Exchange, “FFAs are “over-the-counter” (OTC) products made on 
principal-to-principal basis which provide a means of hedging exposure to freight 
market risk through the trading of specified time charter and voyage rates for forward 
positions” (Baltic Exchange, 2007, www.balticexchange.com). This definition is rather 
complex but reveals that its means is hedging. 
 
According to Investopedia (2007), hedging is “making an investment to reduce the risk 
of adverse price movements in an asset. Normally, a hedge consists of taking an 
offsetting position in a related security, such as a futures contract”. In other words, the 
basic principle of hedging is to cover a risk on the physical market by taking “exactly” 
the opposite position on the paper market. By doing so, the losses on one market will be 
offset by the gain on the other, thus the income will be stabilised at the agreed price.  
 
ABN AMRO, one of the leading bank hedging of the FFA market on behalf of shipping 
companies, proposes a simpler definition: “FFA is a contract to buy or sell the price of 
freight for a specific cargo route over a defined future period”. This explanation includes 
the main terms of a FFA covers (Baltic Exchange, 2007, www.balticexchange.com): 
1. The agreed route.  
2. The date of settlement.  
3. The contract quantity (lots).  
4. The contract rate at which differences will be settled (the agreed price).  
 
ABN AMRO’s definition included as well screen traded freight derivatives. In reality, 
the FFA market is a dual market in which cohabitates the OTC FFAs and screen traded 
(further details will be provided in part  3.1.3). 
 
For Clarkson Securities Ltd which consider themselves as the creator of FFA,  
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FFAs are contracts between two clients; one party (the Buyer) is committed to a 
view that an agreed route (based on an agreed quantity) will be valued higher 
than an agreed rate on an agreed date. The other party (the Seller) contracts to 
differ. In nearly all cases, it will be a component part of one of the Baltic indices 
on the agreed date which determines the rate at which the FFA is settled 
(Clarkson Securities, 2007, www.clarksonsecurities.com). 
 
This definition introduces the idea of speculation. Hedging and speculation cohabitate in 
the intention of uses of FFAs and will be studied in following section  4.3. Further, it is 
highlighted that mostly Baltic indices are used as “commodity”. Other indices used for 
FFA such as Platts will be disregarded in this dissertation. 
 
Lastly, the definition from two maritime economists researching on FFAs appears the 
most complete:  
FFAs are principal-to-principal contracts for difference (CFDs), between a seller 
and a buyer to settle a freight rate, for a specified quantity of cargo or type of 
vessel, for usually one, or a combination of major trade routes of dry-bulk or 
wet-bulk sectors of the shipping industry (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006b, p. 
234). 
 
Currently, FFAs are focused on bulk carrier and tanker freight. However, the Baltic 
Exchange provides data on LPG and will possibly establish an index for containerships 
(Jupe, 2006, p. 20) which can be suitable for hedging purposes. The Hamburg 
Shipbrokers Association assisting the Baltic Exchange for the conception of container 
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index said that containership derivatives would be marketed “by the end of the year” 
(“Boxship Brokers”, 2007). This dissertation will only focus on the dry bulk sector.  
 
3.1.2 Mechanics of FFAs: a two steps mechanism 
FFAs function in two steps which are clearly identified in time: Firstly, the agreement 
when terms and conditions are defined and secondly the settlement when cash is 
exchanged. 
 
3.1.2.1 From a principal to principal agreement… 
As mentioned in the previous definition FFAs are OTC arrangements which means that 
“deals are fixed directly between two counterparties [Principal-to-principal] utilising the 
services of broking intermediaries” (Jupe, 2006, p. 20). 
 
“Brokers, acting as intermediary only, are not responsible for the performance of the 
contract” (Baltic Exchange, 2007, www.balticexchange.com) but should reach an 
agreement on the main terms (agreed route, date of settlement, contract quantity (lots) 
and agreed price) and conditions of the FFABA standard contract.  
 
3.1.2.2 …to settlement price calculation at maturity. 
As mentioned by Clarkson, “All settlements are made in cash and require no physical 
delivery” (2004, p. 3). Since maritime transportation is a non storable “commodity”, it 
cannot be delivered. “Cash settlement against the value of a freight index provided the 
solution” (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006, p. 147).  
 
For time-charter (T/C) paper contract, settlement is against the monthly average of the 
T/C index (indices). For route paper contract, settlement is against the average of the last 
seven index days of the month of the agreed route (Brau, 2006, p. 12). As per the 
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FFABA 2006 standard terms, “settlement is between counterparties in cash within five 
days following the settlement date” (Baltic Exchange, 2007). 
  
Figure 3 summarises the two step mechanism and illustrates two scenarii when the 
average price at maturity is higher than the contracted price (1st scenario) and when the 
average price at maturity is lower than the contracted price (2nd scenario). On the right 
part of Figure 3 the calculation of the settlement price is presented for the two scenarii.  
 
 
FFA 
contracted 
price 
Agreed route spot price 
at maturity is higher 
than agreed price. 
+
-
FFA sellers FFA buyers 
FFA buyers FFA sellers 
Settlement price 
= recent spot average 
- contracted price 
Settlement price 
= contracted price 
- recent spot average 2nd scenario 
payment 
1st scenario 
Agreed route spot price 
at maturity is lower 
than agreed price. payment 
Figure 3: Settlement price calculation according to spot market level at maturity 
Source: Author 
 
If hedge has been carefully selected (referred in the literature to the concept of “perfect 
hedge”), the gain (loss) on the paper market will offset the loss (gain) on the physical 
market and therefore stabilise the freight at the contracted price. 
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3.1.3 A dual market: OTC and screen 
As defined in part ( 3.1.1), FFAs are traded OTC. The dry bulk market has traditionally 
been served as an over-the-counter market directly between market participants, and still 
retains many of these characteristics (Imarex, 2007b).  
 
However, freight derivatives are as well traded on screen through specialised stock 
exchanges (Imarex in Oslo, NYMEX in New York and SGX in Singapore). Also, three 
major FFA brokers Clarksons Securities, Ifchor SA, and Freight Investors Services have 
created in a venture the CIF FFA Trading Screen in London. Such freight derivatives 
traded are comparable with FFAs.  
 
To understand the difference between the OTC and screen traded, the four main terms of 
the FFA agreements will be analysed for both FFA and screen traded freight derivatives. 
 
3.1.3.1 Agreed routes 
For OTC agreements, all indices reported by the Baltic Exchange can be used as 
commodity i.e. dry bulk indices BDI, BCI, BPI, BSI and BHSI as well as all voyage and 
time-charter routes compiled in the indices (see appendix 1). Non standard terms such as 
an average of several routes can be agreed as well. 
 
For FFA screen traded, it is the discretion of each exchange to decide which routes to be 
traded. 
 
3.1.3.2 Date of settlement  
For the OTC agreements, dates of settlement should be agreed by the principals through 
a broker. Dates of settlement are commonly the last day of the month, quarter or 
calendar year. Also, non standard terms can be incorporated in the contract for a special 
maturity date irrespective of the previously presented rule or a “settlement price to be 
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calculated for last 15 days of contract’s life” (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 195). 
They start with the current month and extend up to several calendar years. As per the 
manual for forward panellists (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p.9), reported dates of settlement 
(which are the most common) are maximum eight months, maximum four quarters and 
maximum three years. The maximum limit is due to the fact that the number of the 
reported period is changing over time and that a rollover system has been implemented 
by the forward panellists (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 9). In May 2007, a major FFA 
broker reported an OTC agreement on BPI until the end of 2012 (“SSY Claims”, 2007) 
i.e. for a period of 5 years.  
 
For FFA screen traded, it is the discretion of each exchange to decide which dates of 
settlement can be traded.  
 
3.1.3.3 Contract quantity (lots)  
For the OTC agreements, the quantity of contracts is negotiated between the principals 
through a broker.  
 
For FFA screen traded, the FFA buyer registers the quantity of FFA lots on the exchange; 
each time the quantity of demand and supply match, the trade is confirmed. No 
negotiation between principals occurs and traders do not know their counterpart. That is 
the reason why all the trades are cleared through the official clearing house of the stock 
exchange. According to Imarex (2007b), dry bulk FFAs to a large extent used to be 
traded with full cargo as in the “physical market”. However, a developing technique 
consists in trading small lots in order to attract counterparts (Imarex, 2007b). The 
average number of lots per trade was 148 in 2004 and dropped to 68 in 2007 (Imarex, 
www.imarex.com). (refer to appendix 2). 
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3.1.3.4 Agreed price 
For the OTC agreements, the price is negotiated between the principals through a broker 
that provides an indication of the level of the market, frequently called the market-maker.  
 
For FFA screen traded, FFA prices are communicated on stock exchange screens 
representing the fluctuations of demand and supply of FFA in this specific exchange. 
 
3.1.3.5 FFABA standard contract 
For the OTC agreement, the concept of freedom of contract is applied. Principals 
commonly use FFABA standard contract and incorporate possible negotiated 
amendments. The FFABA standard contract was revised in 2006. For further 
clarifications, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) definitions 
were incorporated in the contract (ABN AMRO, 2006, p. 3). The 2006 FFABA standard 
contract “incorporates ISDA Master Agreement by reference” and improves the original 
contract (Perrot, 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, contracts are “private and confidential” (Jupe, 
2006, p. 22). 
 
3.1.4 The Baltic Exchange FFA index: the Baltic Forward Assessment 
The Baltic Exchange has continuously facilitated the FFA mechanism to develop the use 
of FFAs. For instance, in November 2002, “monthly settlement prices are launched to 
assist in the settlement of FFA contracts” (Baltic Exchange, 2007a, p. 19). Baltic 
Exchange has attempted to attract new FFA traders by increasing FFA price 
transparency. As mentioned in the history of the Baltic Exchange, the introduction of the 
daily BFA has been progressive (see appendix 3). 
 
According to the Baltic Exchange Chief Executive, BFA “is the only independent curve 
available than accurately tell you the prices at which freight derivatives are trading” 
(Penn, 2006). 
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 The BFA reporting has really increase FFA trade transparency since the alternative ways 
to estimate the prices of FFAs were to contact the brokers (for OTC) or to access the 
FFAs exchanges website whose data was either partial or biased. Last month, “Imarex 
has joined the FFABA panel and has begun supply its data for the forward curve 
published every evening used for the mark to market settlement” (“NOS adopts”, 2007) 
i.e. BFA reported routes, time charter and time charter baskets. 
 
3.2 Developments of a growing market but still illiquid 
It is undeniable that the FFA market is growing. However, it is also facing a problem of 
liquidity. 
 
3.2.1 A growing market:  Dry bulk FFAs 
The FFA market is still growing. Market size can be estimated either in signed contracts 
(OTC), lots traded or market value. It is hard to establish the FFA market size since it is 
traded in three different exchanges, one screen platform and through brokers. The Baltic 
Exchange started to publish the record of FFA volume from the third quarter of 2006. 
This data is compiled from 15 leading FFA brokers including two founders of the CIF 
platform, Imarex-NOS and LCH-Clearnet. It is currently the most accurate publicly 
accessible data on FFA volume. Nonetheless, data from FFA brokers Ifchor and SGX 
screen is missing.  
 
3.2.1.1 Dry bulk FFA signed contracts 
To start with, Figure 4 shows the constant increase in number of signed contracts from 
the inception of FFA in 1992 to 2005. 
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Figure 4: Yearly number of signed dry bulk FFA contracts (Jan. 92 -Sept. 2005) 
Source: Clarkson Securities Ltd (Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2006a, p. 189) 
 
3.2.1.2 Dry bulk FFA lots traded 
Table 2 compiles the data published by the Baltic Exchange. The number of lots of dry 
bulk FFA (either in T/C day or in thousands tonnes) traded during the last 12 months 
(from Q3.06 to Q2.07) is 1,584,510. For 2006, it has been estimated from the Baltic 
Exchange press releases (Baltic Exchange, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f) that the total 
dry bulk volume reached 1,320,566 lots. 
 
Table 2: Dry bulk FFA volume in lots (1 T/C or 1,000 tonnes) 
Year, Quarter Lots  OTC Cleared 
2006 Q3 511,105 452,188 88% 58,917 12% 
2006 Q4 313,945 281,745 90% 32,200 10% 
2007 Q1 326,650 282,015 86% 44,635 14% 
2007 Q2 432,810 326,680 75% 106,130 25% 
Total  1,584,510 1,342,628 85% 241,882 15% 
Ave. Q     396,128     335,657 85%    60,471 15% 
Source: Author, data compiled from Baltic Exchange, 2007. 
 
21 
Figure 5 illustrates the constant increase of dry bulk FFA volume from 1992 in FFA 
equivalent tonnage.  
 
 
Figure 5: Total dry bulk FFA volume from 1992 to 2005 
Source: Clarkson Securities Ltd, 2007. 
 
After conversion into FFA equivalent tonnage, Freight Investor Services estimated that 
the FFA market reached, in 2005, 100% of the 5 major bulk trades (Kavussanos & 
Visvikis, 2006a, p. 190) i.e. 38% of the total dry trade (Clarkson Research, 2007a, p. 2). 
In 2007, the Chief Executive of Imarex NOS reported that FFA trade represents 50% of 
the underlying dry bulk seaborne transportation (Mortensen, 2007).  
 
Figure 6 is an estimation of the FFA equivalent tonnage per vessel segment based on the 
figures posted on Clarkson Securities’ website. It illustrates that depending on the vessel 
segment the FFA market differs. For Capesize, the FFA market represented in 2006 
about 70% of its underlying market. In 2006, FFA trade of Panamax indices corresponds 
to 115% of its underlying market. For Supramax, the FFA market represented in 2006 
only 43% of its underlying market. 
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Figure 6: Estimation of the FFA equivalent tonnage (2006) 
Source: Author, data compiled from Clarkson Securities, 2007. 
 
Also, according to Swiss Mar, FFA C4, a dry bulk route, was, in 2005, approximately 
three times larger that the capesize route C4 (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 191). As 
well “in the OTC market, panamax FFA business is regularly around 1.3 times that of 
the underlying physical market” (“Derivatives prosper”, 2007). 
 
3.2.1.3 Dry Bulk FFA traded value 
Since the number of signed contracts and the FFA equivalent tonnage have increased, 
the FFA traded value has also improved. Figure 7 illustrates the raising value. It should 
be noted that the augmentation of FFA traded value is also influenced by the increase of 
the spot market.  
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Figure 7: Yearly value of dry bulk FFA contracts (Jan. 92 - Sept. 2005) 
Source: Clarkson Securities Ltd (Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2006a, p. 190) 
 
FFA market represented USD29 billions in 2005 (Clarksons Securities, 2007a) and 
USD20 billions in 2006 (Baltic Exchange, 2007d) i.e. a drop of 31%. The traded value 
of FFAs has been affected by the decrease of the underlying market.  
 
FFA market is expected to grow up to several time the underlying market (as for 
Atlantic clean tanker route TC2, “Supply gap”, 2007) taking into consideration that the 
derivative market for other commodities are ten times bigger that the underlying market.  
 
According to Mortensen (2007), the FFA trade will continue to grow boosted by the 
high volatility of the market (refer to part  4.3) which is even more increased by the 
interests of speculators and banks on shipping in general (Macquarie, 2006b, p.5).  
 
To conclude, 1,320,566 lots have been traded in 2006 with a nominal value of USD20 
billions and representing about 36% of the underlying market. Even though the FFA 
market has been growing, its liquidity is still limited leading to some problems.  
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 3.2.2 A growing market still facing lack of liquidity 
Since the FFA market is illiquid, it makes it difficult to find a counterparty to support all 
positions or forecasts. The FFA market is growing so still globally illiquid. 
 
“Liquidity determines the number of counterparties available to offset positions in the 
market” (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p.20). Some professionals argue that the problem of 
liquidity is linked to the problem of transparency: “currently [there is] no official record 
of FFA business, therefore making hard for participants to know if there is enough 
liquidity in the market to offset positions” (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p.20). Two major 
ways that have been considered to improve liquidity are register FFA trade (The 
publication started in third quarter 2006 (Baltic, 2006c, p. 36)) and trade smaller lots of 
contracts (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p.20).  
 
Also, trading smaller lots presents other advantages such as (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, 
p.20): 
1. spread credit risk (smaller contracts should be signed with a different 
counterparty),  
2. improve hedge (settlement price against seven days (route) or one month (time 
charter), 
3. attract speculators,  
4. increase flexibility.  
 
Other elements are causing the lack of liquidity such as the lack of demand due to the 
relatively low hedging performance (see  2.1), the hedging substitution (part  4.3.1.1) and 
the frictions of the FFA market ( 5.1). 
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3.3 FFA market participants: the actor of supply and demand 
Two major segmentations of market participants are relevant: the segmentation by 
background and the segmentation by region.  
 
3.3.1 Segmentation of market participants by background 
In 2005, trading houses were negotiated 40% of FFA value and financial houses traded 
10% (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p.20). These data confirmed the estimation for 2005 of 
Freight Investor Services and Clarksons Securities Ltd. (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, 
p. 192) that FFA value was traded by:  
? Shipowners: 20% 
? Charterers and operators (fleet managers and freight traders): 30% 
? Trading Companies: 40% 
? Financial House and banks: 10% 
 
The issue of the type of contract composing the dry bulk indices will be dealt with in 
part  4.1.4. The fact that 30% of the value of FFA trade was made by charterers and 
operators results from the strategy implemented by the Baltic Exchange to compose dry 
bulk indices at 85% with time charter fixtures.   
 
Figure 8 has been adapted from a presentation made by Yao during the 6th FFA annual 
Forum held in Copenhagen in 2006 and illustrates the several concentric tiers of FFA 
counterparties who enter consecutively in FFA markets.  
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Figure 8: Concentric tiers of FFA counterparties 
Source: Author, adapted from Yao (2006, p. 7) and Brau (2006, p. 8)  
 
While tier 1 market participants are interested in hedging and as well as speculating, 
tiers 2 and 3 FFA traders have really little to hedge since the majority of those FFAs 
participants are not involved in shipping and are not directly facing the freight risk.  
 
The FFAs participants are eager to attract new participants (like speculators from tiers 2 
and 3) since it increase FFA market liquidity.  
 
3.3.2 Segmentation of market participants by region 
Regional segmentation of FFA trade has been estimated by some major FFA brokers. 
Nonetheless, they are sometimes contradicting and should only be considered as rough 
indicators. 
 
In 2005, OTC FFA statistics were presented by Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a, p. 192) 
based on an estimation from Freight Investor Services and Clarksons Securities 
representing together 50% of OTC FFA. As per their estimation, FFA trade volume was 
originated at 50% from Europe, 20% from USA and 30% from Asia.  
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 However, Freight Investor Services and Macqueen (2006, p.23), estimated one year later 
that in 2006, 70% of the total FFA trade (OTC + screen) was initiated from Europe, 25% 
from Asia4 and 5% from USA. Further, it is accepted that Asia is the fastest growing 
market (Macqueen, 2006, p.23; “Derivatives prosper”, 2007): Asian FFA volume grew 
from almost nil in 2002 to an estimation of 40% of Asian underlying Seaborne trade in 
2006 (Yao, 2006, p.2). The main hindrance for a stronger Asian development is not the 
lack of liquidity in Asian FFA routes but the lack of knowledge. Also, the European 
FFA market is shifting South with a growing participation of Greek shipowners. “The 
market has seen participant numbers in Greece rise from five to around 35-40 in the past 
few years” (“FFA market”, 2007).  
 
To conclude, the liquidity can be achieved if more market participants enter and trade all 
routes. The Baltic Exchange dry bulk indices are in some aspects partially representing 
the market (see part  4.1 for further analysis). Some further research could investigate if 
the fact that major shipowning countries like Greece or China owning older tonnage are 
still under represented in the FFA market can be explained by the segmentation of the 
indices. 
 
3.4 Assessment of FFA market efficiency thanks to competition analysis 
The objectives of this section are to analyse if the FFA market is efficient and if it is in a 
state of pure and perfect competition. Firstly, the existing research will be contemplated 
and then four assumptions of the state of pure and perfect competition will be analysed.  
 
                                                 
4 The commercial director of Pacific Carriers, Mr. Keith Denholm, said “Asia accounted for about 30% of 
all trades” (“Baltic Finalises”, 2007). Also, it has been reminded that Taiwan Maritime Transport is very 
active on the Asian FFA market.   
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3.4.1 Contribution of the research on FFA hedging performance 
Initially, the hedging performance of the freight derivatives (BIFFEX) was really low 
because the underlying market BFI was a composite of routes. As pointed out by 
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a, p. 240), “Number of attempts to resolve [the hedging 
effectiveness] issue were made by the industry (Kavussanos & Nomikos, 2000, p. 245), 
and involved changing the structure of the underlying index to make it more 
homogeneous”. The researchers advise the Baltic Exchange decrease the spread between 
the market and the indices and to provide hedgers with the possibility to trade the route 
and not only the index. “The [Baltic] indices should as much as possible represent the 
market to increase hedging efficiency” (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006b, p. 152). 
Researchers’ voices have been heard and leaded to the inception of the BDI in 1999.  
 
This change with the introduction of the FFAs has been a real improvement of the 
hedging performance of freight derivatives, “FFA contracts provide better hedging 
opportunities than the BIFFEX contract” (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 248). 
However, the hedging performance of freight derivatives is comparatively low with 
other derivatives as reported by Bera et al. (1997, pp. 97-106) and in Koutmos and 
Pericli (1999, pp. 335-363). 
 
After perusal of several methods, it appears that “Simple OLS first-difference regression 
is the preferred method for estimating hedge ratios in voyage routes P1 and P2” 
(Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004, p. 933).  
 
To summarise the findings of research on hedging performance, first the hedging 
performance of FFAs is better than BIFFEX, second it is comparatively low with other 
derivatives and third it “varies from one freight market to the other” (Kavussanos & 
Visvikis, 2004, p. 933).  
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This dissertation will go one step forward than the hedging performance analysis. The 
focus will not be on the symptom (Is the market efficient or not?) but on the causes 
themselves (Can the market be efficient?). Therefore, potential hindrances to the FFA 
efficiency will be investigated.  
 
Since the objective of the FFA market is hedging freight risks, an efficient FFA market 
should be able to fulfil a maximum of hedge demander at the most competitive price. In 
macroeconomics, the equilibrium price is the price at which the quantity demanded 
equals the quantity supplied (Lipsey, Courant & Ragan, 1999, p. 81). The laws of supply 
and demand5 require that all market participants are price-takers (Dobson & Palfreman, 
1999, p. 99) i.e. that the market is purely and perfectly competitive. The state of pure 
and perfect competition requires four assumptions:  
1. Homogeneous product. 
2. Absence of entry and exit barriers. 
3. Perfect knowledge of market participants. 
4. Atomicity of the market 
 
Hence, the four assumptions of the pure and perfect competition will be investigated for 
the FFA market. 
 
3.4.2 Homogeneous product 
The FFAs market is in reality a dual market (reference to part  3.1.3). On the one hand, 
OTC FFAs representing 85% of the FFA market are differentiated products since the 
contract can be amended and tailor-made as per counterparties’ demand. On the other 
hand, the screen traded FFAs corresponding to 15% of the FFA market are standard 
                                                 
5 For more information on supply and demand of FFA, refer to  4.3 
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products which can be considered as homogeneous. Besides the differentiation of OTC 
FFA, FFAs are dealing with different sub-sectors of sea transportation of dry bulk.  
 
The global FFA market (OTC + screen) can be divided in three segments related to size: 
? 70% of FFA market value is trading Panamax indices  
? 20% of FFA market value is trading Capesize indices 
? 10% of FFA market value is trading Supramax indices 
Handisizes have just recently become available for traders and is differentiating even 
more the offer to FFA traders. For OTC FFA, Capesize vessels attract 40% of FFA 
market value, Panamax 37% and Handymax 23% (Kavussanos & Visvikis 2006a, p. 
192).  
 
3.4.3 Absence of entry and exit barriers  
A pure and perfect competitive market should have no entrance or exit barriers so that 
all market agents can freely enter or leave the market.  
 
3.4.3.1 High barriers at entrance of the market  
The FFA market remains an exclusive club. There are mostly two hindrances: lack of 
knowledge and the financial liability related to FFA trade.  
 
Firstly, the lack of knowledge of FFAs resulted in some actors being reluctant to use 
them. It is often said that about six months is required to enter into the market to really 
understand the principle of FFA, have the relevant contacts (OTC FFA through brokers) 
or fulfil all the exchange requirements (screen FFA) (The Baltic, 2006a, p. 30). During a 
survey on derivatives organised in 2005 (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p. 20), it has been 
shown that 37% of the respondents (shipping companies all potential users of derivatives) 
are not familiar with FFAs. In reality, shipping companies with large turnover (> USD 
100m) are familiar at 92% but 100% of small shipping companies (< USD 9m) are mot 
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familiar with FFAs. “The results [of the survey] suggest a correlation with size and level 
of familiarity of the freight derivative market” (Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p. 20). 
 
Secondly, in theory, small companies can be naturally put aside of FFAs since their lack 
of reputation could indirectly affect their cash flow as shown in Figure 9 and will 
increase the price of FFAs. In addition, the initial margining of clearing house, 
amounting from USD 100,000 (NOS) to USD 203,184 (LCH), are often repulsing small 
market participants who do not have sufficient cash flow. Therefore, it can be said that 
FFAs traders are large shipping companies or corporations. 
 
Small shipping 
companies 
 
Weak cash flow 
 
No reputation 
Perceived high 
credit risk 
 
Need for clearing 
More expensive 
FFAs 
Large sums can be 
tight before maturity 
 
Affected cash flow 
 
Figure 9: Consequences of FFA trading for small shipping companies 
Source: Author. 
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 As mentioned by Noble Chartering manager, Raghu Raghunath, “many shipowners 
don’t have USD10 million to open credit lines – if they had USD 10 million they would 
buy another ship instead” (Baltic, 2006, p. 35). Reference is made to part 4.2.4 on the 
atomicity of the market.  
 
3.4.3.2 Medium barriers at exit of the market 
In theory, it is quite easy to exit the market. It is just needed to sell or buy back your 
screen traded FFA and then to net6 all your positions. For OTC FFA, since the products 
are tailored-made it is almost impossible to resell the contract. Therefore, the FFA trader 
is locked with his liability up to the maturity of the contracts. Since the majority of the 
traded contracts have a maturity within two months, no real problem of exit barrier 
exists. However, Lloyds List (“SSY claims”, 2007) has reported an OTC agreement on 
BPI until the end of 2012. Therefore, assuming that some amendments have been made 
to the FFABA standard form, the counter-parties would be locked into the market for 5 
years. 
 
3.4.4 Perfect knowledge of market participants: flow of information affecting the 
market. 
Most of scholars recognise that the markets (FFA and spot) are affected by some input 
of information creating some fluctuations of the price.  
 
Since the transaction costs were lower for FFAs, it has been assumed that aware market 
agents preferred trading FFA to the spot market as for the BIFFEX (Kavussanos & 
Nomikos, 2003, p. 226). Therefore, it was alleged that FFA had a price discovery 
                                                 
6 Net: Settlement mutual obligations at the net value of a contract as opposed to its gross dollar 
value. 
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function. Thanks to Kavussanos and Visvikis’ study published in 2004, it has been 
demonstrated that  
FFA prices tend to reflect new information more rapidly than spot prices in all 
[major panamax] routes. This pattern is though to reflect the fundamentals of the 
underlying asset since, due to limitations of short selling and higher transactions 
costs of the underlying spot rate, investors who have collected and analysed new 
information would prefer to trade in the FFA rather than in the spot market 
(Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004, p. 2046). 
 
However, the same scholars find “bidirectional causality in price movements in all 
routes, but less clear evidence on the direction of volatility spillovers between spot and 
forward prices across different routes” (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004, pp. 2045).  
 
It is obvious that the spot market at maturity will contain more information than the FFA 
since all the information analysed from the agreement to the maturity will be 
incorporated since FFA rates are between 15-30 days ahead of spot rates (Kavussanos & 
Visvikis, 2004, p. 2033). Naturally, FFAs with short maturity such as one month or two 
months have a better forecasting performance.  
 
Also, the FFA market was facing a problem of transparency affecting the access of 
information to all market participants. This problem has been solved when the Baltic 
Exchange started its publication (refer to part  3.2.1). 
 
To conclude, market participants should have a good knowledge of the market but the 
main issue consist in the lag of the FFA between the agreement and the maturity.  
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3.4.5 Atomicity of the market  
The current market is not atomic because some buyers and sellers are large corporations 
able to affect the FFA market. The Pareto’s rule of imbalance is respected, for instance, 
at the Imarex exchange “around 20% of participants have accounted for around 80% of 
the transactions” (Boe, 2005, p. 89). Furthermore, it necessary to keep in mind that the 
major FFA traders are financially powerful and can influence the market.   
 
Companies willing to hedge are mostly large shipping companies amongst others 
because of the entrance barriers (see part  3.4.3.1). FFA development to smaller 
companies is still limited due to some hindrances that FFAs are still suffering from. 
 
 
In conclusion, the FFA products are not really homogeneous. Further to the high number 
of routes available, the homogeneity is lost because of the duality of the market since 
only 15% are standard products. The barriers at the exit of the market are medium 
depending on the maturity date and the specificity of the agreement. But the barriers at 
entrance are huge so that only large corporations can enter the market. The absence of 
atomicity of the market is a consequence of the entrance barriers. There are few market 
participants and the largest 20% concentrates 80% of the market value (Boe, 2005, p. 
89). The FFA market is therefore in a state of oligopoly and oligopsony. There is good 
access to information but uncertainty related to the 2-steps mechanism, the lag between 
the agreement and the maturity. Therefore, the FFA market is not in a state of pure and 
perfect competition and consequently can not be efficient.  
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 Chapter 4 -  Interrelations between freight forward agreements and the spot 
market 
The interrelations between FFAs and the spot market are complex. Firstly, the main 
representation of the dry bulk spot market is also the data provider for the settlement 
price calculation of the FFAs. So, the Baltic Exchange dry bulk indices conflict to 
represent the market and to comply with index users’ needs (part  4.1). Secondly, 
researchers have studied the possibility to forecast the spot price using the FFA price. 
However, the outcome is quite poor. Part  4.2 will investigate why the forecasting 
capabilities of the forward freight agreements are limited on the empirical aspect. Since 
the FFAs could not exist without the spot market and its risk, the supply and demand of 
FFAs will be compared with the perceived freight risk from the spot market (part  4.3).  
 
4.1. Baltic dry bulk indices: spot market representativeness vs FFA users’ 
interests 
“Indices [should] reflect the daily movement in rates across dry-bulk spot voyage and 
time-charter rates” (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006, p. 235). To achieve this objective, the 
Baltic Exchange has created the Freight Indices and Futures Committee (FIFC). The 
FIFC should be guided by the following principles: maintain geographical balance 
(Pacific/Atlantic, fronthaul/backhaul), avoid illiquidity (no routes with seasonality), 
privilege business standard terms, respect a commercial balance (T/C and voyage) and 
limit the number of routes (Baltic Exchange, 2007c, p. 6).  
 
However, as a data provider to fix the settlement price of FFAs, the index should be 
elaborated to fulfil FFA participants’ demand. In case of contradiction between the 
36 
demand of FFAs traders and the obligation of representiveness of the underlying market, 
it is uncertain which side the Baltic Exchange will privilege.  
 
That is the reason why this section is analyzing the current Baltic dry indices’ 
segmentation to analyse its representativeness focused on five criteria:  
? Segmentation by number of vessels or carrying capacity    
? Segmentation by age of the vessels 
? Segmentation by ocean basin 
? Segmentation by type of contracts 
? Segmentation by routes 
? Index multipliers 
 
4.1.1. Segmentation by vessel size 
Since the 2nd of January 2007, the BDI is equally composed of BCI, BPI, BSI, and BHSI. 
However, as per the data compiled by Clarkson Research Services (2007, pp. 14-19), the 
segmentation of the market by vessels’ size either using fleet capacity or the number of 
vessels differ from the Baltic Exchange’s segmentation. These differences are 
represented in Figure 10: 
 
  
Figure 10: Segmentation by vessel size 
Source: Author, data compiled from Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Research Services Limited, 2007. 
Note: Handymax should be read Supramax. 
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On the one hand, the Baltic Exchange is over representing the number of larger vessels. 
On the other hand, the Baltic Exchange is under representing the carrying capacity of 
larger vessels. Therefore, it seems that an “intermediate” way has been taken to 
represent both carrying capacity and number of vessels. 
 
Furthermore, if taking into consideration the size of the vessel described in the Baltic 
time-charter descriptions, the size selected is always the most common type of vessel 
with each segment and represents from 29% to 60% of each vessel category. 
 
Table 3 calculates the representation of the vessel size sub-segment selected by the 
Baltic Exchange time-charter descriptions. 
 
Table 3: Representation of the vessel size described in Baltic Exchange 
Vessel size 
Baltic 
vessels Representation (vessels) Representation (m.DWT)
segmentation  
Description 
(DWT) Vsl Nb. Total % m.DWT Total % 
Handysize 
                   
28,000  797 2,771 29% 22.0 74.1 30% 
Handymax 
                   
52,454  558 1,522 37% 29.7 72.8 41% 
Panamax 
                   
74,000  842 1,421 59% 62.6 103.6 60% 
Capesize 
                 
172,000  406 727 56% 70.7 123.6 57% 
Source: Author, data compiled from Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Research Services Limited, 2007. 
 
Note: The sub-segment of the Panamaxes selected by the Baltic Exchange (74,000 DWT) 
represents 60% of the total Panamaxes carrying capacity. 
 
To conclude, the BDI equal segmentation between BCI, BPI, BSI and BHSI can be 
justified to be representative of an “intermediate” way between fleet carrying capacity 
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and number of vessels. In addition, even though the sub-segment chosen in the vessel’s 
description is always the most common; it represents sometimes only 29% of the 
number of vessels. This lack of representativeness will affect the demand of FFA for 
hedging purposes since shipowners of vessels within sub-segments not represented in 
the BDI will either adjust their hedging strategy or reject FFAs as an efficient hedging 
tool.  
 
Research, beyond the scope of this dissertation, can be extended to compare the fleet of 
the shipowners trading FFAs and the vessel description in the Baltic indices to find a 
possible correlation. 
 
4.1.2. Segmentation by age of the vessels 
In the vessel’ descriptions of the Baltic Exchange, the maximum allowable age is also 
defined. As illustrated in Table 4, it appears that the selected age is less representative of 
the underlying market. For instance, only 32% of the fleet of handysize is younger than 
15 years and 63% is older than 20 years (Clarkson, 2007a, p. 18). 
 
Table 4 summarises the calculations regarding the proportion of vessels and their 
carrying capacity falling within the age limit proposed by the Baltic Exchange.   
 
Table 4: Representation of vessel age described in Baltic Exchange in the underlying market 
Vessel 
Maximum Age Carrying Capacity 
Number 
vessel 
Handysize 15 years 33.0% 32.0% 
Handymax 10 years 53.0% 50.0% 
Panamax 7 years 41.0% 38.5% 
Capesize 10 years 48.0% 46.0% 
Source: Author, data compiled from Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Research Services Limited, 2007. 
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However, older tonnage can still be incorporated and tuned by panelists to fit route 
description. “In noting any market activity that is transacted by ships that are older than 
a specified maximum, panelists are expected to use their discretion in adjusting theses 
rates to the route definitions” as well “panellists are expected to make an allowance for 
any extra insurance premium [related to the age of the vessel] payable by an owner” 
(Baltic Exchange, 2007c, p. 9).  
 
Those two last possibilities offered to panellists should increase the correlation between 
old tonnage and the indices tonnage. However, many shipowners of old tonnage will be 
reluctant to contract FFAs since their freight risk is not directly represented by the 
underlying indices (refer to Figure 16: Decision tree to select FFA for hedging strategy).  
 
4.1.3. Segmentation by ocean basin 
As representative of the market, each index is composed of routes in the Pacific or 
Atlantic basin and should be “maintaining a balance between fronthaul and backhaul 
routes.” (Baltic Exchange, 2007, p. 6) 
 
Table 5 shows the results of an estimation of the geographical weight for each index. 
This estimation of the geographical weight is not taking into consideration the origin or 
the destination of the cargo that has been researched several times but focus on the 
distances stemmed, since maritime transport services are estimated by ton-miles. Since 
for each segment (Capesize, Panamax, Supramax and Handysize) the carrying capacity 
is similar (25% as per the Baltic Exchange segmentation), the only considered variable 
is the distance in nautical miles. The slight difference of carrying capacity within BCI 
(see appendix 1) has been disregarded for the sake of simplicity and because the 
difference will be only marginal.  
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For routes originated from one ocean basin and heading in the other, the distance 
stemmed in each basin has been calculated so the routes are apportioned proportionally. 
When routes used a range of ports, the furthest has always been chosen. See appendix 4 
for details of calculation. 
 
Table 5: Geographical segmentation of indices (by ton-miles and sea basins) 
  BCI BPI BSI BHSI BDI 
Atlantic 43% 47% 38% 50% 45%
Pacific 57% 53% 62% 50% 55%
Source: Author, data compiled from Baltic Exchange. 
 
Table 5 shows that the ton-miles of the indices are globally privileging the Pacific basin. 
Comparing this finding with the dry bulk market geography would have been of interests 
for general knowledge but is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In addition, 
shipowners with a freight risk in the Pacific should be in theory more active in the FFA 
market. Thus, Asian traders are not very active FFA market participants but this fact is 
not due to the lack of available Pacific routes. 
 
4.1.4. Segmentation by type of contracts 
The BDI is built with 15% voyage charter and 85% time charter. Looking closer, only 
the BCI is elaborated with voyage assessments which represent its 60%.  
 
This result is precious because the voyage charter-party is normally only signed between 
two counterparties and all subsequent charter-parties are time-charter-parties. As 
illustrated by Figure 11, it is common that several charterers are intermediaries between 
the cargo owners and the shipowners. 
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 Cargo 
owners 
 
Charterers 
 
Charterers 
 
Charterers 
Ship 
owners 
VOY. T/C T/C T/C
Figure 11: Example of legal relation between agents within maritime transportation chain 
Source: Author 
 
As a consequence, more time-charter parties are signed than voyage charter parties. 
Therefore, the highest risk for maritime transport agents is represented by hire (time 
charter) rather than freight (voyage charter). So, the Baltic Exchange by incorporating 
time charter rate within its indices increase the number of potential FFA traders. Already 
30% of the value of FFA trade emanates from charterers and operators that are in the 
middle of the maritime transportation chain.  
 
Hence, it is questionable whether reporting time-charter rate is representative of the dry 
bulk market. In addition, it is not clear which time-charter should be reported by the 
panelist. Further research could investigate these specific issues that are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  
 
4.1.5. Segmentation by routes 
Route selections should represent the market and as well fit the requirements of indices 
users. In the Baltic Manual to panellist (2007, p.4), it is reminded that indices are “used 
widely in the underlying physical freight market; as settlement mechanisms for FFAs; 
and in a range of market research and dispute settlement roles.”  
 
For example, during the FFABA 2006 annual conference, held in Copenhagen, FFAs 
users were openly requiring from the Baltic Exchange to divide round voyages into two 
sub-routes. In January 2007, Route S4 (Transatlantic time charter from Europe to 
Europe via US Gulf) was subdivided in S4A and S4B. However, the route S4 was a 
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round voyage since it represents the reality of the market. Vessels are ballasting from 
Europe to the US Gulf, load cargo at one US Gulf port and then discharge in a European 
port. It is an example of that the interests of the FFABA has been preferred to the 
representativeness of the indices.   
 
As stipulated in the last update of the manual to panellists of the Baltic Exchange (2007, 
p.4), “route assessments and the production of its indices [are] the responsibility of the 
Freight Indices and Futures Committee (FIFC) (…) to ensure it has the views [among 
others] of the Forward Freight Agreement Brokers’ Association (FFABA)”. That is the 
reason why for each change of routes the FFABA has to be consulted. Moreover, 
previously and by convention “the FIFC comprises the chairman of the FFABA” (Baltic 
Exchange, 2001, p. 7). 
 
Later in the manual, the importance of the impact of FFA and FFABA on indices is 
acknowledged: “With the development of the FFA trade (‘swaps’), even closer attention 
has been paid to the returns for each individual route” (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 6). 
 
4.1.6. Index multiplier 
In order to reach the initial index level of 1,000 and to merge voyage charter and time 
charter, the Baltic Exchange is using route multipliers.  
 
Also, when the BFI became BDI in November 1999 a multiplier of 0.998007990 was 
applied directly on the index. Since the introduction of the BHSI into the calculation of 
the BDI, which dates back to the 2nd January 2007, would have pulled down the BDI 
level; a multiplier of 1.192621362 applies as well on the BDI.  
 
An important contradiction appears in the BHSI inception between the willingness to 
represent the market and the obligation not to drastically affect the index. In a larger 
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perspective, the challenge consists in meeting both the objective of representativeness 
and the interests of index users. On the one hand, the introduction of the BHSI into the 
BDI should fulfill the Baltic Exchange’s objective for its indices “designed to reflect the 
daily movement in rates across dry-bulk spot voyage and time-charter rates” 
(Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 235). Therefore, it can be assumed that BHSI has 
been included into the calculation of the BDI in order to increase BDI representativeness 
of the daily movements of the market. On the other hand, the Baltic Exchange was not 
willing to drop the BDI level by the inception of a cheaper index which will 
tremendously affect the users of the indices.  
 
On the 4th August 2007, the BDI reached the historical level of 7,000 points. With no 
BHSI introduction, BDI should have been at 7,060 points (only 0.85% difference) 
proving that the route multiplier has been carefully chosen. But with no index multiplier, 
it should be around 5,900 which should have changed the perception of the market.    
 
Furthermore, the application of a significant multiplier on the BDI itself not only leads 
to an increase of 19.26% the level of the BDI, but also changes the volatility of the 
indices.  
 
In conclusion, even though the Baltic Exchange is continuously adapting the BDI 
structure, some gaps between the indices and the underlying market can be found 
illustrating the impact on the BDI of the growing influence of FFA traders. The partiality 
of the indices (restricted vessel age span, subdivision of routes, size of the vessel…) may 
serve the interests of current FFABA members. However, it will not only decrease the 
representativeness of the indices but as well diminish a large amount of maritime 
companies’ interests in FFA trading. Last but not least, the increase of consideration of 
the FFABA by the Baltic Exchange signifies that the Baltic indices became a “marketing 
product” for FFAs. 
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 Further research beyond the scope of this dissertation should be conducted to study if a 
relation can be found between the fleet characteristics of major shipowners trading FFAs 
(size, age…) and the indices segmentation. 
 
4.2. Limited forecast capabilities 
The limited forecast capabilities of the FFAs will be investigated by studying two 
empirical aspects of the FFA trade. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that the forecasting 
performance can be achieved only temporarily. Secondly, the FFA price is an average of 
biased perceptions and as such should not be considered as market forecasting tools.  
 
4.2.1. Temporary forecasting performance 
According to major scholars (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 243; Batchelor et al., 
2003), one of the main interests to build forecasting models is “as a non storable service, 
forward rates of sea transportation are not tied up to spot market but are free to be 
determined by a speculative activity”.  
 
However, high forecasting performance can not be maintained since it will reduce the 
profit for speculators and stop the need for hedging. The liquidity of the FFA trade will 
therefore be reduced and so the quality of the forecast. Figure 12 shows the flow of 
events from a temporary high forecasting performance leading to a poor forecast. 
 
As a starting point, the assumption has been taken that the forecasting performance of 
FFAs was high. The problem is that as soon as the forecasting performance is identified 
by market participants, the demand of FFAs leading to a lack of liquidity which is a 
condition sine qua non of forecasting performance.  
45 
 FFA price = unbiased 
prescriptors of spot prices 
FFA agreed price 
≈ spot price at maturity 
Loss or almost no 
benefits for speculators 
Limited speculative 
demand of FFA trade 
 
Limited FFA trade 
FFA agreed price  
≈ Settlement price 
Loss or almost no 
benefits for hedgers. 
Limited hedging  
demand of FFA trade 
 
Lack of liquidity 
Low  
Forecasting performance 
High forecasting 
performance 
Figure 12: Temporary forecasting performance chain of events 
Source: Author 
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 Event though, the maritime industry is eager to reduce the perception of freight risks by 
establishing some accurate forecast of the spot market, the reduction of perception of 
freight risks itself will reduce the demand of FFAs. 
 
4.2.2. FFA price is an average of biased perceptions. 
According to Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a, p. 245), the price of an FFA is equal to 
Ft,T = Et(ST) i.e. the forward price is equal to the expectations by the market of the 
freight rate that will prevail at the maturity. It is pointed out that “this is not an exact 
pricing relationship and its validity depends, among other things, on how precisely 
expectations are formed in the market (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 245)”.  
 
However, FFA traders’ expectations are not precise and are related to principals’ 
objectives. Three kinds of counterparties’ objectives exist: hedgers to hedgers, hedgers 
to speculators and speculators to speculators.  
 
4.2.2.1 Absence of forecast for hedgers to hedgers 
Pure hedgers do not have to realise a forecast but just take the opposite position in the 
paper market than the risk exposition in the physical market. The hedge will come 
thanks to the offset of the losses on one market by the gain on the other. However, it is 
said that few hedgers purely hedge. According to Clarkson (2004), all hedgers realise a 
forecast and adjust their hedging strategy accordingly.  
 
4.2.2.2 Forecast deviation for hedgers to speculators 
The hedgers as mentioned in the previous section will take the opposite position than its 
physical risk but the speculators will realise a forecast. Therefore, the forecast will be 
biased according to the speculators’ position in the FFA agreement either seller or buyer. 
This situation (hedgers to speculators) is really common since it is the essence of 
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derivatives which “reduce or control the unwanted risk of price change [by the hedgers], 
by transferring it to others more willing to bear the risk [the speculator] (Kavussanos & 
Visvikis, 2004, p. 928).” 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Buying hedgers with selling speculators 
In the case that the hedgers are buying FFAs and have speculators as counterparties, the 
forecast realised by the speculators is illustrated in Figure 13.  
 
There is a deviation between the FFA agreed price and the forecast of the speculator 
which correspond to the total transactions costs: transaction costs + speculative margin. 
 
Transaction costs include broking (commissions or spread), a cost equivalent to the 
counterparty credit risk (clearing), trading cost (opportunity costs, administrative …) 
and legal costs.  
 
First of all, the transaction cost mentioned in the literature and above is slightly 
confusing because it will apply only to hedgers. Speculators looking at FFAs as a source 
of income will have other requirements. Speculators will incorporate a margin in relation 
with the perceived risks. It is hard to quantify the total transaction cost (transaction costs 
+ speculative margin) since it fluctuates, and differs according to the value of the 
agreement and the value of the perceived risks.    
 
Nonetheless, broking and clearing are easy to assess since commission and spread are 
known in advance and clearing fees are published. Also, legal costs are present but 
marginal. These costs will oscillate between 0.55% and 0.70% depending on the route 
and the clearing house. 
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Trading cost is more complex since it is taking into account many aspects either 
fluctuating or specific to each organisation:  
? Cost of borrowing (interest rate and bank margin) 
? Opportunity cost (interest of a risk free investment)  
? Administrative cost 
The speculative margin is the key to all speculative houses. It should be calculated after 
the preparation of forecasts, probabilities and safety margins. Taking into consideration 
that a risk free investment like a US treasury bond is remunerated at 5% and that the 
monthly fluctuation of a capesize can reach 22% within a month (C4 in June 2007), the 
speculator can not expect less than a 15% return.  
 
 
Figure 13: Buying hedgers and selling speculators 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 14 shows that the FFA agreed price is a biased indicator if buyers are hedgers and 
sellers are speculators. The deviation between the FFA agreed price and FFA sellers 
forecast of the spot price at maturity is at least 15% of the FFA agreed price.    
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4.3.1.2.2 Selling hedgers and buying speculators 
In the case that the hedgers are selling FFA and have speculators as counterparties, the 
forecast realised by the speculators is illustrated in Figure 14:  
 
 
Figure 14: Selling hedgers and buying speculators 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 14 illustrates that the deviation between the FFA agreed price and FFA buyers 
forecast of the spot price at maturity is at least 15% of the FFA agreed price.    
 
4.2.2.3 Contradicting forecast for speculators to speculators agreements 
The situation is even more confusing when the counterparties of an FFA trade are two 
speculators because they will both trade in order to make profit; therefore, their forecasts 
will be importantly different (at least 30%). As mentioned by Kavussanos and Visvikis 
(2006, p. 234), “One counter-party takes the view that the price of an agreed freight 
route, at an agreed time, will be higher than the current level and buys FFA contracts. 
The other party takes the opposite position, and sells FFA contracts.” 
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 Figure 15 illustrates the two contradicting forecasts of the speculators.  
 
 
Figure 15: Contradicting forecasts of the speculators 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 15 demonstrates that the deviation between the two FFA speculators’ forecasts of 
the spot price at maturity is at least 30% of the FFA agreed price.    
 
In part  4.2.2, it has been demonstrated that the FFA market participants have different 
forecasts. The deviation between the forecast of the spot price at maturity and the FFA 
agreed price is at least 15% of the FFA agreed price. The sign of the deviation has to be 
related to the principals’ background (hedgers or speculators) and position in the market 
(buyers or sellers). The situation is even more confusing since real hedgers are scarce 
and since it is almost impossible to assess per contract (example: C4 maturity in 
September 2007) the proportion of buying speculators, selling speculators and hedgers. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the FFA price is an average of biased perceptions 
and as such should not be considered as precise market forecasting tool. 
  
In conclusion, a high forecasting performance as soon as detected by market participants 
will lead to a lack of liquidity in the market and therefore will decrease the forecasting 
performance of the FFA agreed price which is only an average of biased perceptions of 
the spot prices at maturity.  
 
4.3. Freight risks related supply and demand of FFAs 
“The price of each FFA contract is determined at the balance of demand and supply for 
the particular contract (Batchelor et al., 2007, p. 111)”.  
 
As a service, the production and consumption of FFA are simultaneous. However, as an 
OTC product, there is no production of FFA. The demand of FFA emanates from the 
buyers and the supply from the sellers. Every market participants can be part of the 
demand or the supply or even change along the maturity. Consequently, it is more 
relevant to focus on the uses of FFAs for each market participant. Furthermore, since the 
FFA market is the aggregate of each market participant’s actions, the focus will be on 
the shipping companies. In this section, some tools from the management arena will be 
used such as decision tree or SWOT. 
 
The demand and supply balance is influenced by the two main uses of FFAs, either to 
transfer freight risks (hedging) or to take freight risks (speculation). Then, a SWOT 
analysis will be performed to understand the relation between the strategic decision to 
use FFAs and the environment. Since, in the perspective of risk management, FFA is a 
way to convert freight risk into counterparty credit risk, the former issue will be 
considered.  
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4.3.1. To transfer freight risks: Hedging  
First of all, the substitution of hedging should be investigated to understand the demand 
of FFAs. Then, the demand will be subdivided into sub-categories according to the main 
hedging strategies. 
 
4.3.1.1 Substitution of traditional hedge 
Shipping is an old industry and has not waited for the FFAs to create ways to transfer 
freight risks.  
 
The bareboat charter excludes the shipowners from all operational responsibilities that 
are transferred to the charterers. Therefore, shipowners will act as an asset manager and 
will only finance and own the vessel. That is the reason why this kind of charter will be 
excluded from the following decision making analysis. 
 
The period time charter secures for a period the income of the shipowners since the 
commercial function (chartering) will be outsourced to the charterers. It presents 
numerous advantages such as:  
? voyage costs transferred to charterers (including bunker costs) 
? some liabilities transferred to charterers 
? employment security, even ballast legs will be remunerated 
? positive cash flow management (income guarantee) 
? useful as collateral. 
 
As recommended by Mohanan (2000, p. 420), Figure 16 is a decision tree built to 
describe the decision making under uncertainty to select FFA (modern risk transfer), 
forward period time charter (traditional risk transfer) or forward spot market (risk 
retention) for a hedging strategy. The decision tree applies to either supplier or 
demander of maritime transportation.  
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 Figure 16 illustrates that either one vessel will terminate its time charter in a forward 
position such as two months or that a charterer owns a contract of affreightment starting 
in a forward position such as two months. The decision tree presents in Figure 16, 
maximum three consecutive steps (left column) and leads to four alternative decisions 
(terminal nodes in the right column). In each step, hedgers should reply to one question 
(decision nodes in the column in the middle) by yes or no (Mohanan, 2000, p. 456).  
 
Step one: Hedging effectiveness. 
The physical risk should be correlated to one available route or index. If the vessel being 
open in two months is similar to vessel description of one of the index, the physical risk 
(trading the vessel) can be considered as highly correlated to the available route/index 
(see appendix 1). If the owned contract of affreightment starting in two months is for a 
cargo described in the routes or requires a type of vessel and routes incorporated in the 
index, the physical risk of the charterer can be considered highly correlated to the 
available route/index. The issue of representiveness has already been introduced in part 
 4.1. 
 
Step two: Forecast and risk aversion. 
If the market forecast is positive (increase for shipowner or decrease for charterer) and 
freight risk is acceptable (high probability that the forecast will happen), the hedgers 
should refuse to trade FFA and fix forward vessel on the spot market.  
 
Step three: Substitution of time-charter. 
The forward time-charter should be compared with FFA as a substitute. For the 
shipowner, if the T/C available for his vessel is at acceptable rate and/or more 
competitive than FFA, the vessel should enter in a time-charter period. For the charterer, 
if the T/C available for a vessel able to move the cargo efficiently and/or more 
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competitive than FFA, the charterer should fix forward a time-charter. Otherwise, FFA 
can be traded. 
 
Is physical risk correlated 
with available route/index? 
Is market forecast positive 
and freight risk acceptable? 
Exit decision 
making process 
YES 
NO 
Forward spot 
market 
Is available period T/C at 
acceptable rate and/or more 
competitive than FFA? 
Forward  
Period T/C 
 
Trade FFA 
 
Step one: 
Hedging 
effectiveness 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
Step two: 
Forecast and 
risk aversion 
Step three: 
 
Substitution of 
time -charter 
 
Questions 
 
Decisions 
 
Decision-
making step 
 
Figure 16: Decision tree to select FFA for hedging strategy 
Source: Author, inspired by Gray, 1990, pp. 39-40 and Mohanan, 2000, p. 456. 
 
This decision tree has been designed for shipping companies like charterers, cargo 
owners or shipowners to select between the substitute of forward spot, forward period 
T/C and FFA. Yet, the demand/supply of hedgers will be the aggregate of each 
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organisation’ actions. The amount of supply and demand will be affected by the hedging 
strategy implemented by the market participants.   
 
4.3.1.2 Hedging strategies 
Gray (1990, pp. 42-43) presents four major classical strategies used while hedging on 
derivatives. These strategies can still be applied to FFA. Consequently, after having 
decided to trade FFA, hedgers are normally applying one of the four following strategies. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 The expansion hedge 
On the one hand, charterers restrict their activities to the normal level of their risk 
portfolio. This level of accepted risks can be expanded by hedging risks coming from a 
new contract of affreightment.  
On the other hand, some risk adverse shipowners may normally charter out their vessels 
on period time charter in order to maintain their income. Their acquisitions of tonnage 
are directly related to new period time charter contracts signed. Nowadays, they can 
purchase a vessel, operate her on the spot market and guarantee their income by hedge 
of FFA.    
 
4.3.1.2.2 The positioning hedge 
A principal forecasts a positive market in a couple of months. He can remain on the spot 
market hedging FFA upto the moment the market is in his favour and then benefits 
directly from the market without hedge. Therefore, FFA can be a fantastic tool of 
flexibility. 
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4.3.1.2.3 The basis hedge 
As explained by Gray (1990, pp. 42-43),  
A charterer and a shipowner may both wish to fix a given very forward position, 
but be unable to agree a rate (…). They can now fix fully firm, all terms and 
details agreed, except the rate. The rate can be based on a formula derived from 
the spot index at the time of shipment. Both parties will have the security of 
knowing that the voyage will be performed and (…) can take out the appropriate 
freight futures hedge. 
This exact strategy is being used by Quintana Maritime Ltd and Cargill, fixing M/V 
Barbara for one year time charter based on the 4 T/C routes based on Baltic Average 
(Quintana, 2006, p.1).  
 
4.3.1.2.4 The blanket hedge 
This hedging strategy permits the hedgers to limit the freight risk without loosing the 
gain opportunity from the spot market. Hedgers will use FFA to cover only one part of 
their risks and benefits of the spot market for the rest.  
 
This section has proven that the supply and demand of the FFA market was determined 
amongst other by the willingness of market participants to hedge risk, the decision to 
hedge with substitute and the choice of hedging strategy implemented.  
  
4.3.2. To take freight risks: speculation. 
The second part of the supply and demand determinant is the speculation. As mentioned 
by Gray (1990, p. 119), an “essential element in any futures market will always be 
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speculation”. FFAs are no exceptions to this and options (put, call, swaps…) are the best 
tools for speculators. Options will not be dealt with in this dissertation since it is beyond 
its scope. 
 
Also, similar to other derivatives, FFAs are “used to transfer risk from the risk-averse 
hedgers to the risk-hungry speculator” (Gray, 1990, p. 119). Actually, only a minority of 
hedgers tends to fully cover their risks in the paper market since a majority prepares a 
forecast and speculates that the market will follow their expectations or implement some 
strategies requiring only partial hedge (e.g. blanket hedge). The specialised press is 
frequently reporting some major losses in the FFA market and its bad effect on shipping 
companies’ finance. However, a pure hedger should never complain about losses on 
FFA since they will be offset by incomes in the physical market. Therefore, the official 
statements present in the press can be taken as illustrating the fact that most companies 
using FFAs for hedging purposes are simultaneously speculating.  
 
In order to speculate, two major types of analysis are realised. Firstly, a fundamental 
analysis will focus on the levels of supply and demand and factors (causality analysis) of 
the underlying market. Secondly, the technical analysis (time series analysis) scrutinized 
prices movements to extrapolate those movements (Gray, 1990, pp. 121-123). 
 
4.3.3. SWOT analysis: Hedging or speculating FFAs 
This section will enable the investigation to go further, to understand internal and 
external elements that will be taken into consideration to either hedge or speculate, 
which ultimately will affect the level of supply and demand.  
 
The SWOT analysis is an acronym for Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. 
This recognized tool of corporate strategy will be used to identify to which extent 
hedging or speculating FFAs is relevant to the fast moving shipping industry. 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
SHIPOWNERS / FFA SELLERS 
? Maintain commercial control of vessel  
thus give flexibility1 to asset players to 
enhance 2nd hand market value 
? Increase market share without new 
purchase1  
CHARTERERS / FFA BUYERS 
? Simplicity: Remove operational risks2,3  
? Possibility to offer hedging services to 
customer1, like within Klaveness pool4.  
BOTH FFA BUYERS AND SELLERS 
? Speculation “directional play”5. 
?  Possibility of clearing6  
? Guarantees forward incomes/costs of 
transportation1, positive cash flow 
management 
? Clear and easy contract7. 
? FFA used as price discovery tool. 
? Complete traditional physical risk 
management techniques8. Alternative / 
Substitution of T/C,  
? Flexibility: Tailored hedge: choice of 
route, size, period, date of settlement. 
Hedge better than locked charterparty 
hire level5,8 
? Cheap: transaction costs lower 
commission than physical trade8 
? Confidentiality8  
BOTH FFA BUYERS AND SELLERS 
? Knowledge required in a highly 
fragmented industry5, 13 
? No visibility/transparency “Private and 
Confidential contracts”14 
? No atomicity of the market/Pareto rule: 
Few current active main players 14 
? Cost of clearing. 
? Limited liquidity, difficulty to find 
counterparty for OTC FFA10 
? Difficult hedging effectiveness: Choose 
the appropriate hedge. 
? Limit of price discovery. 
? Difficult balance between speculation and 
hedge. 
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 Opportunities Threats 
? Market risk9. Increased fluctuations. 
Need to hedge10 
? Difficulty to find “amicable” charterers5 
enhanced by consolidation in the sector. 
? Arbitrage opportunities between physical 
and paper market2 
? Clearing houses and stock exchange 
developments. 
? Longer dated settlement options “will 
attract a whole category of user to the 
markets.”11 increasing liquidity. 
Possibility to trade FFAs option upto 
2012 “increasing the utility in structured 
finance deals11 
? Development of education on FFA will 
increase liquidity 12 
? Bad image: Legacy of BIFFEX, a 
historical failure5 
? Innovation in a conservative industry 5 
? Quickly spread “bad news” 14 such as 
counterparty failure or attempts of 
manipulation. 
? Credit/Counter-party/payment default 
risk15, 10 
? Attempt of index manipulation16. 
 
 
Figure 17: SWOT analysis: hedging or speculating FFAs 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
1: ABN AMRO, 2006, p. 11 
2: Raghunath, 2006, p. 26 
3: Clarkson, 2004, p. 8 
4: www.klaveness.com
5: Jupe, 2006, p. 17 
6: Raghunath, 2006, p. 23 
7: Perrot, 2006 
8: Clarkson, 2004, p. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9: Brau, 2006, p. 13 
10: Jagani & Thabel, 2005, p. 19 
11: “SSY claims”, 2007 
12: Yao, 2006. 
13: Macqueen, 2006, p. 22 
14: Jupe, 2006, p. 22 
15: Jupe, 2006, p. 23 
16: Reference is made to  0
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 This SWOT analysis has listed the major elements that are considered to enter into the 
FFA market and possible trade FFA. Depending on the weighting of each element by the 
corporation added to the company specific considerations, the decision of trading FFA is 
taken. This analysis made it possible to understand what major elements both internal 
and external have either a positive or negative impact in the decision to negotiate an 
FFA.  
 
In conclusion, the agreed price of FFA is defined by the negotiated power of 
counterparties and affected by the level of demand and supply of FFA. This level of 
supply and demand is itself related to the intention of hedging and speculating of the 
market participants. Numerous elements have an impact on the level of supply and 
demand such as the substitution to hedge, the choice of strategies and many others 
presented above in the SWOT.   
 
4.3.4. Risk conversion: the counterparty credit risks 
Risk management identifies the FFA as a product to transfer freight risks into 
counterparty credit risk. Counterparty risk, named as well credit risk, is of paramount 
importance in the FFA trade. Counterparty defaults of payment could lead to a double 
loss for hedgers (loss in the physical market and loss of the settlement price). For the 
speculators, the loss will be limited to the FFA transaction costs and speculative margin 
(see parts  4.2.2.2 and  4.2.2.3) but the risks taken in the transactions have doubled 
(freight risk and credit risk).  
 
That is the reason why clearing is well developed. Nowadays, for dry bulk FFAs, 10-
15% of the FFA trades are cleared (Mortensen, 2007). Reference is made to Table 2: 
Dry bulk FFA volume in lots (1 T/C or 1,000 tonnes). Clearing share of the FFA trade is 
expected to grow (“LCH Clearnet”, 2007). The current market share is already high 
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taking into consideration that the market as mentioned by the director of information 
services of Imarex, Mikal Boe, that Pareto’s rule of imbalance is respected: “around 
20% of participants have accounted for around 80% of the transactions” (Boe, 2005, p. 
89). Those major 20% of participants do not need to be covered by clearing since they 
are generally humongous trading houses of turnovers of several billion dollars.  
 
Four clearing houses are currently competing in the FFA clearing market:  
? NYMEX Clearport: New York Mercantile Exchange clearport 
? LCH: London Clearing House 
? NOS: Norwegian Options and Futures Clearing House 
? SGX Asia Clear: Singapore Exchange Asia Clear 
As per Lloyds List (7th June 2007), “Competition heated up last month between the 
clearing houses”. Several services are offered by clearing house such as the elimination 
of counterparty credit risk and the netting of position.  
 
The FFA is a risk conversion of freight risk into counterparty credit risk; the clearing 
house services permit to remove the counterparty credit risk.   
 
To conclude, the level of supply and demand of the FFA market is the aggregate of the 
willingness of market participants to either take or transfer freight risks.  
 
In conclusion, the Baltic Exchange is struggling to adjust its indices to market 
fluctuations. Some gaps between the indices and the underlying market can be 
interpreted as the fulfillment of FFABA needs. The increase of consideration of the 
FFABA by the Baltic Exchange shows that the Baltic indices became a “marketing 
product” for FFAs. The gaps will not only decrease the representativeness of the indices 
but also diminish a large amount of maritime companies’ interests in FFA trading 
(hedgers missing the correlation of their freight risks and the traded index).  
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Furthermore, a high forecasting performance as soon as detected will decrease.  Also, it 
has been demonstrated that it is not correct to use FFA agreed price as a forecasting tool 
since it is only an average of biased perceptions of the spot prices at maturity.  
Lastly, the price of FFA is not equal to the expectations by the market of the freight rate 
that will prevail at the maturity. However, it is also affected by the level of supply and 
demand of the FFA market that corresponds to the demand to either take or transfer 
freight risks.  
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 Chapter 5 -  Analysis of possible price distortion using seasonality analysis 
During perusal of the press for the purpose of this dissertation, some articles regarding 
the allegations from FFA market participants that some “manipulations” of the indices 
occurred have attracted attention. If confirmed, these manipulations are an impact of the 
FFA trade on the indices and can be considered a further interrelation between FFA and 
the spot market. This chapter will first analyse the friction in the FFA market ( 5.1) in 
order to define an objective of the analysis ( 5.2) and to select the data to be investigated 
( 5.3). Then, the implementation of the appropriate methodology will make it possible to 
fulfill the objective ( 5.4).   
  
5.1. Frictions in the FFA market.  
This section will consider the allegations of price distortion of some FFA market 
participants. Then, the preventive measures that the Baltic Exchange has undertaken will 
be presented. Finally, the experience in other derivative markets will be used as 
benchmark of potential manipulations within the FFA market.  
 
5.1.1. Allegations of price distortion: “route manipulations” 
Some rumours of “manipulations” of the freight indices have been reported in the press 
(“Holidays”, 2004). Some market participants argued that some reported fixtures were 
far below from the market level (“Italians turn”, 2005). In addition, it has been alleged 
that some vessels are wrongfully open on the spot while employed for other contracts 
(“Dirty Dry Tricks”, 2004). The objective of these “manipulations” is to pull the market 
down (“Manipulations spurs”, 2005). Further equivalent methods are used to lift up the 
market in order to support FFA traders’ position in the FFA market.  
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 On the one hand, the dry bulk spot market can not be “driven” because of its tremendous 
size compared to the atomicity of its suppliers and demanders. On the other hand, part of 
the FFA market participants are very large shipowning companies or humongous trading 
houses; the continuous consolidation in the mining and commodity trading sectors has 
reinforced the latter. Therefore, a niche (for instance a route of the index) within the spot 
market during a short period could be affected by one market participant. When 20% of 
the FFA market participants accounts for around 80% of the transactions (Boe, 2005, p. 
89), it can be understood that some traders have some interests to see the indices moving 
in their favour. 
 
That is the reason why it has been alleged that most of the voyage routes were affected 
by those manipulations since their settlement price is estimated on the spot average of 
the 7 last index days of the month (“Accusations of 'rigging'”, 2005). These 
“manipulations” are decreasing the entire demand of all FFA routes and reorienting to 
FFA whose settlement price is a monthly average (Baltic, 2006a, p. 31). Also, for OTC 
FFA, it is common to amend the FFABA standard form with a monthly settlement date. 
The period of index for the calculation of the settlement price has been identified long 
ago as being the weakest link of the freight derivatives. On 1st November 1999, the 
BIFFEX extended this period from 5 days to 7 days because it “addresses a concern 
voiced some time ago that the contract was potentially subject to manipulation over a 
period as short as five days” (“IT matters”, 1999).  
 
5.1.2. Prevention of the Baltic Exchange 
The Baltic Exchange has always been willing to prevent misuse of its indices. In the 
section entitled “good practice to avoid market abuse”, the Manual to panellists forbid 
the Baltic Exchange employees to trade FFAs and point out that the panel report is 
confidential and “must not be available to anyone else including other staff or 
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departments in the [panel] companies”. However, employees of panel companies are 
allowed to trade FFAs either as brokers or principals but should report their activities to 
the Baltic Exchange. 
 
Even though “Panellists will not normally be influenced by (…) movement in the 
derivative markets or period market, unrelated to the positions being assessed” (Baltic 
Exchange, 2007b, p. 10), the Baltic Exchange recognized in the same document that 
“occasions have arisen when it has been suggested that the physical market is being 
affected by principals seeking to influence panel returns, and hence the settlement rate 
which will be applied to their FFA positions” (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p.13).  
 
In order to avoid manipulation of the indices, the Baltic Exchange advices their 
panellists to “bear in mind the following points” (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 13):  
? Panellists are entitled to take into consideration all relevant market 
information. Whilst panellists will give due weight to reported fixtures, they 
are not bound to return a ‘last fixed’ rate if, in their opinion, other factors, 
such as tonnage offering below last done, or charterers bidding higher, 
suggest the fixture no longer represents the market;  
? When business is concluded at varying rates, panellists are entitled to 
exercise their discretion in determining the relative influence of each fixture 
to their returns;  
? Fixtures which have not been fully concluded but which are subject to 
outstanding approvals should be assessed appropriately.  
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? If panellists are aware of any outside party directly attempting to influence 
their returns, the matter should be reported to the Baltic Freight Market 
Reporter.  
? Panellists are not expected to consider the motives underlying any bona fide, 
properly reported market activity. (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 13). 
 
Further, the Baltic Exchange to illustrate their intention to circumvent any manipulation 
of the indices states that the panellist should disclose its participation “in any form of 
freight derivatives trading (whether as broker or principal), always bearing in mind that 
any panellist, or any employee of the panellist, may have direct or indirect interests in 
freight derivatives” (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 16).  
 
Moreover, “neither the Baltic Exchange nor its employees are permitted to trade in any 
freight derivatives market” (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 21), FFA activities are 
controlled during the audit of the Baltic Exchange: “The statutory annual audit carried 
out includes (…) disclosure to the satisfaction of the Baltic of the extent of any 
involvement in freight derivatives business” (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 29). 
 
Furthermore, the Baltic Exchange is trying to separate the panelist reporting for the 
calculation of indices in the shipbrokers’ office to their FFA brokers colleagues.  
 
Daily reports from panellists are strictly confidential between the Baltic 
Exchange and the nominated representative of the panel company. Panellists are 
bound by the confidentiality clauses in the letter of appointment. Their daily 
reports must not be made available to anyone else. This includes other staff or 
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departments in the company, and in particular to any department or staff 
involved in the derivatives markets (Baltic Exchange, 2007b, p. 21). 
 
5.1.3. Benchmark in other derivative markets: basic types of manipulation 
It should be borne in mind that other derivatives markets have already seen abuses. The 
Financial Policy Forum is a reliable think tank, which aims to “conduct economic policy 
research into financial markets, analyze how they impact the overall economy” 
(Financial Policy Forum, www.financialpolicy.org). In its report entitled “Consequences 
of liberalizing derivatives markets”, the Forum maintains that market abuses such as 
fraud and manipulation are “threats to market integrity and efficiency”. In addition, 
some scenarii will be imagined based on the basic types of manipulation which are 
presented in the same report: 
? Information-based manipulation involves communication of partial 
information: vessels wrongfully open on the spot market, fake tonnage 
requirements or false report of the market to orientate one route of the spot 
market.  
? Action-based manipulation involves the deliberate distortion of the indices 
underlying the FFA trade by reporting fixtures which are not representative 
of the market. 
? Trade-based manipulation involves using one market (one route of the 
indices) to capture the gains from creating a price distortion in another 
interrelated market (FFA trading the same route).  
In conclusion, price distortions have been alleged by several concordant sources. It 
seems that the risk of manipulations is serious and can badly damage the hedging 
performance and the trading of FFAs. Therefore, the following section will analyse the 
data of the underlying market to trace some possible evidence of price distortion.  
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5.2. Objective of the seasonality analysis 
The objective of this research is to assess if the underlying routes of the dry bulk indices 
are affected by the way the FFA settlement prices are calculated either with an average 
of the 7 last index days for voyage routes or a monthly average for time charter. 
 
5.3. Data analysed 
Focus will be kept on the routes composing the BCI i.e. the index representing the 
Capesize vessels because it is the only index which includes some voyage routes since it 
is composed of 40% of the time-charter routes and 60% of the voyage charter routes.  
 
Daily spot prices of the routes have been obtained thanks to the Baltic Exchange. The 
daily spot prices from their date of introduction till May 2007 of the voyage routes C3 
(from May 1998), C4 (idem), C5 (from March 1999), and C7 (idem); time-charter route 
C10A (from November 2002) and P2A (idem); and the basket of 4 time-charters of BCI 
(from march 1999) have been chosen to compare the behaviour of the 7 last index days 
of each month. 
 
For the sake of comparison of the seasonality of the daily spot prices of the routes, 
Figure 18 differentiates the analysed routes. 
 
Settlement price period Analysed routes 
differentiation Monthly 7 last index days 
Yes 4 TC BCI  -  P2A C4  -  C7 Commonly  
FFA traded No C10A C3  -  C5  -  C12 
Figure 18: Matrix of the analysed route differentiations 
Source: Author 
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5.4. Two-steps methodology and consequent findings 
After trial of several methodologies, it has been decided that the most suitable method 
will be inspired by the variance-to-mean analysis. This method makes it possible to 
study the monthly seasonality of the spot market represented by the indices.   
 
5.4.1. Choice of the centered moving average of 21 index days 
Indices are only published on United Kingdom business days. On average 21 index days 
per month are published. A period of 21 index days has been chosen since it corresponds 
to the average of index days per month.  
 
The moving average has been preferred to a monthly average since the high volatility of 
the spot market will increase the variance for the two extremes of the period i.e. 
beginning and the end of the month.  
 
The analysed data has a strong positive trend since all routes have increased from their 
introduction to May 2007 from 150% for route C12 up to 1,016% for the average of 4 
T/C BCI routes. Thus, choice of the moving average is very critical. On the one hand, 
unsuccessful trial has been made to calculate the moving average on the 21 index days 
before the data analysed but the results were strongly and structurally positive. On the 
other hand, unsuccessful trial has been made to calculate the moving average on the 21 
index days after the data analysed but the results were strongly and structurally negative. 
Therefore, a centered moving average will be used. Thus the moving average starts 10 
index days before the analysed day and finishes 10 days after, as shown in Figure 19.  
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 Centered moving average of 21 index days (CMAday i) 
1  index day  
(S day i) 
10 index days 
= analysed 
data 
10 index days 
Figure 19: Centered moving average of 21 index days 
Source: Author 
 
5.4.2. Mean of the daily gap analysis using a standardised month  
 
5.4.2.1 Daily gap calculation 
The daily gap (GAPday i) is calculated by subtracting the moving average (CMAday i) to 
the spot price (S day i).  
(1) GAP day i = S day i – CMA day i 
The daily gap (GAP day i) is expressed in USD. A positive (negative) sign in front of the 
daily gap (GAPday i) will mean that the spot price (S day i ) is higher (lower) than the 21 
index days centered moving average (CMAday i). These results will be compiled in the 
Table 6.  
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5.4.2.2 Mean of the daily gap 
 
Table 6: Table of calculation of mean of the daily gap 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year N  
Month 
Day 
Jan. ………Dec. 
1 ……………12 
Jan. …….Dec. 
1 …………..12 
Jan. …….Dec. 
1 …………..12 
Mean 
GAPi … … …  
: 
… … … … …  … … … … …  Mean i W.Meani 
GAPj … … …  
: 
… … … … …  … … … … … Mean j W.Meanj 
1 
: 
: 
: 
31 = n GAPn … … …  … … … … …  … … … … …  Mean n W.Meann 
Source: Author 
 
The mean of the daily gap (Mean i) is calculated as follows:  
(2) Mean i = Σ (GAP day i) / N day i 
Where N day i is equal to the total number of index days falling on the same day of the 
month for the entire period.   
However, the total number of index days falling on the same day of the month for the 
entire period (N day i) is consequently different for each day of the month. In order to 
avoid over-representation of infrequent index days, a weighted mean of the daily gap 
(W.Mean i) is calculated as shown below:  
(3) W.Mean i = Σ (GAP day i) x N day i x 31 days / N 
Where N is equal to the total number of index days per each data series.  
 
5.4.2.3 Bar chart of a standardized month 
The mean of the daily gap (Mean i) and the weighted mean of the daily gap (W.Mean i) 
are compiled in a bar chart in Figure 20 for each index to illustrate a standardized month 
entitled “Mean of the daily gaps from centered moving average of 21 index days”.  
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Figure 20: Bar chart of standardised month for analysed routes 
Source: Author 
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5.4.2.4 Main findings from the standardised month 
The previous bar charts clearly show seasonality within the studied data. It is clear that 
the last index days of the month are lower than the centered moving average of 21 index 
days. 
 
A pattern of seasonality can be seen thanks to the standardised month. The first 6 daily 
gaps are slightly negative up to the pivot 1 from 6th to 8th of the standardised month. After 
pivot 1, the daily gaps are increasing a lot and are strongly positive up to the peak on the 
15th. After the peak, the daily gaps remain positive up to pivot 2 falling on the 22nd of the 
standardised month. Following pivot 2, the daily gaps are really negative reaching the 
nadir on the 29th. Finally, from the 29th up to the 31st the daily gaps are increasing but 
remain negative.  
 
Five out of the eight studied routes have a similar pattern of seasonality. They are the 
basket of four time-charters of the BCI which is well FFA traded, the voyage routes well 
FFA traded C4 and C7, and voyage routes not well FFA traded C3 and C5. However, the 
pattern of seasonality is different for the routes C10A and C12 which are not directly 
traded as well as the P2A route that is part of another segment. 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that at least three factors are influencing the pattern of 
seasonality:   
? Type of route: T/C or voyage 
? Route segment: Capesize, Panamax…  
? Intensity of the FFA trade. 
 
However, it is hard to assess the level of the price distortion of the 7 last index days using 
this method. In the following section, another method will be used to overcome the 
methodology drawback. 
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5.4.3. Mean of the daily gap analysis by period segmentation  
Since the fact that spot prices were following a monthly seasonality pattern has been 
confirmed, this second analysis objective is to assess the level of the seasonality of the 7 
last index days of each month.  
 
5.4.3.1 Segmentation of the month by period 
In order to estimate the real impact of the 7 last index days, further calculations based on 
the segmentation of the month by period have been realised. Each month, the data is 
segmented into three periods for the entire duration of the analysed data as follows:  
? Period 1: Entire month 
? Period 2: 7 last index days 
? Period 3: Rest of the month 
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 5.4.3.2 Calculation of the average and standard deviation of the daily gaps by 
period 
 
Table 7: Calculation of the average and standard deviation of the daily gaps by period 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year N Average 
           Month 
Day 
Jan. ……….Dec. 
1 …………..12 
Jan. ……….Dec. 
1 …………..12 
Jan. ……….Dec. 
1 …………..12 
 
GAPi … … …  
: 
… … … … …  … … … … …    
GAPj … … …  
: 
… … … … …  … … … … …   
1 
: 
: 
: 
31 = n GAPn … … …  … … … … …  … … … … …   
Average ave.GAP1 ave.GAP 1 ave.GAP 1 AVE.GAP 1 
Period 1 Standard 
deviation 
sd.GAP1 sd.GAP 1 sd.GAP 1 S.D.GAP 1 
Average  ave.GAP2 ave.GAP 2 ave.GAP 2 AVE.GAP 2 
Period  2 Standard 
deviation 
sd.GAP2 sd.GAP 2 sd.GAP 2 S.D.GAP 2 
Source: Author.  
 
The average of the daily gaps of the entire month (AVE.GAP 1) is calculated as follows: 
(4) AVE.GAP 1 =  Σ (ave.GAP 1, month i, year i + … +  ave.GAP 1, month n, year n)  / Nmonth n 
Where  
ave.GAP 1, month i, year i is the average of the daily gaps of index days falling under period 1 
(entire month) for the selected month. 
Nmonth n is the number of month for the full period.  
 
The average of the daily gaps of 7 last index days (AVE.GAP 2) is calculated as follows: 
(5) AVE.GAP 2 =  Σ (ave.GAP 2, month i, year i + … +  ave.GAP 2, month n, year n)  / Nmonth n 
Where  
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ave.GAP 2, month i, year i is the average of the daily gaps of index days falling under period 2 
(7 last index days) for the selected month. 
 
The average of the daily gaps of the rest of the month (AVE.GAP3) is calculated as 
follows: 
(6) AVE.GAP3 = (AVE.GAP1 x 31 + AVE.GAP2 x 7) / (31-7) 
 
The average of the standard deviation of the daily gaps of the entire month (S.D.GAP 1) 
is calculated as follows: 
(7) S.D.GAP 1 = Σ (sd.GAP 1, month i, year i + … + sd.GAP 1, month n, year n) / Nmonth n 
Where  
sd.GAP 1, month i, year i is the standard deviation of the daily gaps of index days falling under 
period 1 (entire month) for the selected month. 
 
The average of the standard deviation of the daily gaps of the 7 last index days 
(S.D.GAP2) is calculated as follows: 
(8) S.D.GAP 2 =  Σ (sd.GAP 2, month i, year i + … +  sd.GAP 2, month n, year n)  / Nmonth n 
Where  
sd.GAP 2, month i, year i is the standard deviation of the daily gaps of index days falling under 
period 2 (7 last index days) for the selected month. 
 
These results (AVE.GAP1, AVE.GAP2, AVE.GAP3, S.D.GAP1 and S.D.GAP2) are 
compiled in a table. Further, some other indicators are calculated to compare time-charter 
and voyage charter even though their spot prices (Si) are really different.  
 
Firstly, the mean of each index for the entire period is calculated as follows:  
(9) Mean = Σ (S i) / N day i 
 
Secondly, the relative average of the daily gaps of the 7 last index days is estimated 
thanks to index 1:  
(10) Index 1: AVE.GAP2 / Mean x 1,000  
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 Thirdly, the consistency/stability of the average of the daily gaps of the 7 last index days 
is estimated using index 2:  
(11) Index 2 = S.D.GAP2 / AVE.GAP2 
 
5.4.3.3 Summary of results: average of the daily gap analysis by period 
segmentation 
 
Table 8: Average of the daily gaps from the centered moving average of 21 index days for all studied 
routes (in USD, except for index 1 &2) 
  
AVEGAP
1 
AVEGAP
2 
AVEGAP
3 
Mean 
Index 
1 
S.D. 
GAP1 
S.D. 
GAP2 
Index 
2 
C3 0.005  -0.078 0.030 18.654 -4 0.448 0.259 3.32
C4 0.009  -0.043 0.024 10.977 -4 0.400 0.227 5.30
C5 -0.003  -0.055 0.012 9.217 -6 0.264 0.154 2.81
C7 -0.004  -0.052 0.009 11.575 -4 0.284 0.187 3.60
C12 -0.009  -0.150 0.032 24.836 -6 0.592 0.345 2.29
C10A -29.84  -580.87 130.87 51,182 -11 2563.43 1574.07 2.71
Ave 4TC 
BCI -17.24  -245.51 49.34 35,751 -7 1292.68 790.77 3.22
P2A -16.50  -272.52 58.17 29,846 -9 1104.66 749.80 2.75
Source: Author. 
 
Note: In bold are represented most FFA traded routes (>4%)  
5.4.3.4 Main findings from the period segmentation 
The average of the daily gaps of the entire month (AVE.GAP1) is small, showing that the 
moving average of 21 days gives homogenous data and appears to be an appropriate time 
span to limit structural variance due to price volatility.  
 
The average of the daily gaps of the 7 last index days (AVE.GAP2) is negative for all 
studied routes. Therefore, seasonality can be confirmed; the last 7 index days of the 
month are on average inferior than the entire month. Thus, spot prices are dropping from 
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the centered moving average for the 7 last index days between USD0.04 to USD0.15 for 
voyage routes and USD245 to USD581 for time-charters. 
 
The average of the daily gaps of the rest of month (AVE.GAP3) is positive for all studied 
routes. This result confirms that the sign of average of the daily gaps of the entire month 
(AVE.GAP1) is due to the level of impact of the average of the daily gaps of 7 last index 
days (AVE.GAP2). 
 
This analysis has the advantage to provide figures directly communicable in USD. 
However, to compare the average of the daily gaps of 7 last index days, it is necessary to 
establish an index in order to understand the relative size of the seasonality. Thanks to 
index 1, it can be concluded that the type of contract of the route has an influence on the 
seasonality. The seasonality is relatively smaller for voyage routes C3, C4, C5, C7 and 
C12 than for time-charter routes C10A and P2A, as well as the basket of time-charter 
routes (Ave. 4 TC BCI). This finding is in direct contradiction with the presumption that 
voyage routes are more targeted by manipulations since the time span of the price 
settlement calculation is smaller.  
 
Index 2 estimates the stability of the average of the daily gaps of the 7 last index days; in 
other words, the consistency of the seasonality. For all studied routes, index 2 is above 1 
(S.D.GAP2>AVE.GAP2) showing that the seasonality is not steady; thus, it is punctual. 
Routes C5, C12, C10A and P2A have a more consistent seasonality since the index is 
relative lower (below 3). It can be concluded that routes C3, C7 and Ave. 4 TC BCI are 
relatively instable because the index 2 is between 3 and 4. Finally, route C4’s seasonality 
is truly unstable. Taking into account that route C4 is the most traded route (it 
concentrated in 2005 30% of the FFA transactions), it might be a coincidence that its 7 
last index days of route C4 have the highest inconsistency. 
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Inconsistency 
FFA traded  
Low 
inconsistency 
Relative 
inconsistency 
High 
inconsistency 
Yes P2A 4 TC BCI – C7 C4 
No C5 - C10A – C12 C3  
Figure 21: Matrix of inconsistency of the seasonality and FFA trade intensity 
Source: Author.  
 
From this matrix, it can be concluded that FFA traded routes have a higher inconsistency 
of its seasonality. However, two exceptions appeared P2A and C3.  
 
P2A is part of the Panamax segment of the index. It has been estimated that the Panamax 
segment would be the most FFA traded in 2007. Further studies would permit to 
conclude if the seasonality can only be seen in the Capesize index or if it is general.  
 
C3 is the route transporting Iron Ore from Turabao, Brasil to the range of Beilun-
Baoshan, China. In practice, few vessels are open next to Turabao, Brasil but more tends 
to be open either in European seas or in Chinese seas. Therefore, charterers need to fix 
vessels coming under ballast condition to load the cargo. On the one hand, vessels 
ballasting from Europe are closer to Puerto Bolivar (route C7). One the other hand, 
vessels ballasting from the Pacific Basin are closer to Richard’s Bay (route C4). In these 
conditions, it is clear that C4 and C7 rates could spill over route C3. 
 
To conclude, it has been proven that 5 out of 8 routes are following the same seasonality. 
The three routes not following the same pattern of seasonality belongs either to another 
segment or are not traded by FFAs. In addition, it has been demonstrated that the 7 last 
index days of the month are lower than the centered moving average of 21 index days. In 
this analysis, it is not possible to understand if this seasonality is only to be related to a 
price distortion of FFA market participants. The relevant conclusion to FFA practitioners 
is that the 7 last index days are affected by the seasonality and could be manipulated. 
Therefore, it is recommended for all FFA buyers of voyage routes to amend the FFABA 
contract and to trade on a monthly average basis.    
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 Further analysis demonstrated that time-charter routes are relatively more affected than 
voyages routes. No conclusion can be extrapolated thanks to this analysis. However, it 
should be noted that the types of manipulations presented in part  5.1.3 and therefore the 
price distortion can affect both voyage charter and time-charter routes. 
 
The inconsistency is higher for voyage routes than for time-charter routes showing that 
irregularly the market deviates from its “normal seasonality” and rise. These irregular 
rises of the index mostly affecting voyage routes can be a price distortion on the up side. 
Finally, the fact that route C4 has a disproportionate inconsistency of its seasonality 
confirmed that it has concentrated the largest price distortion from May 1998.  
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Chapter 6 -  Conclusion 
 
6.1 Major findings of the dissertation and possible recommendations 
In addition to improving the knowledge of the author on FFA, the dry bulk spot market 
and the BDI, this dissertation has revealed the following:  
 
1. Pure and perfect competition 
The FFA market is not in a state of pure and perfect competition mostly because of large 
barriers at entrance (financial and knowledge hindrances) that have caused an 
oligopoly/oligopsony market.  
In order to obtain a more competitive thus efficient market, the barriers at entrance 
should be lifted. All initiatives aiming at reducing these barriers should be promoted.  
 
2. The impact on the BDI of the growing influence of FFA traders 
The Baltic Exchange indices are partially representative of the market since the Baltic 
Exchange serves FFA traders’ interests. The change of the index multiplier due to the 
pressure of index users reduces the representativeness of the BDI.  
The Baltic Exchange should be clearly reorganised to limit the influence of the FFA 
traders within its organisation. On the longer term perspective, maintaining representative 
indices is the only way to maintain the reference both as a market indicator and a data 
provider of derivative settlement price.  
 
3. The Baltic indices became a “marketing product” for FFAs 
The fact that only young tonnage is considered in the index has marginalised shipowners 
of older tonnage to trade FFAs and to be represented in the BDI. The decision to 
incorporate 85% of time-charter routes in the BDI has permitted shipowners to attract 
many charterers and operators trading 30% of FFA value. 
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4. The empirical limitation of the forecasting capabilities 
The limitations of the forecasting capabilities have been proven. High performance 
forecast can only be temporary. In addition, FFA prices are only an average of biased 
perceptions of the spot prices at maturity and as such can not be used as a valid 
forecasting tool.  
Even though the shipping industry is always looking for forecasting tools, FFAs’ proven 
limited forecasting capabilities should prevent its utility.  
 
5. FFA pricing thanks to supply and demand of FFAs 
In contradiction to Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006, p. 245), the price of FFA is not equal 
to the expectations by the market of the freight rate that will prevail at the maturity. Its 
pricing is far more complex. FFA is due to the level of supply and demand of the FFA 
market that corresponds to the demand to either take or transfer freight risks. The demand 
and supply is the aggregate of companies’ actions that could be affected by many aspects, 
both internal and external summarised in a SWOT analysis.  
 
6. Monthly seasonality of the capesize routes 
It has been proven that five out of eight studied routes are following the same pattern of 
seasonality. It has also been proven that the 7 last index days of the month are lower than 
the centered moving average of 21 index days between USD0.04 to USD0.15 for voyage 
routes and USD245 to USD581 for time-charters.  
 
7. Price distortion of the spot prices by FFA traders 
This analysis does not allow for understanding if this seasonality is only to be related to a 
price distortion of FFA market participants. However, the fact that inconsistency of 
seasonality is higher for voyage routes and disproportionate for C4 can be interpreted as a 
piece of evidence of price distortion. 
It is recommended that all FFA buyers of voyage routes should amend the FFABA 
contract and to trade on a monthly average basis.  
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6.2 Potential further research 
The preparation of this dissertation has triggered many questions which have not been 
dealt within the literature. Regarding the representativeness of time-charter in the dry 
bulk market, is the current ratio 85% for time-charter and 15% for voyage charter 
representative of the freight market value, volume or just not representative?  
 
Many other aspects of the research on FFAs can be developed such as a comparison 
between the characteristics of the vessels either owned or fixed by FFAs traders (the 
physical risk) and the vessel description in the index (the hedgeable risk).  
 
The seasonality analysis used in this paper can be applied on all routes of the BDI and 
could lead to a conclusion if the seasonality can only be seen in the Capesize index and 
one Panamax route or if it is general. Also, the research can be implemented for the wet 
bulk indices. Furthermore, it would be of interest to analyse the causes of seasonality and 
to investigate why time-charter routes are more affected by the seasonality.  
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APPENDIX 1: Routes descriptions 
 
Table 9: Baltic Exchange Capesize Index Composition 
Route Shipment size Cargo Route description 
Duration 
(days) Weightings
C2  160,000  Iron ore  Tubarao to Rotterdam   10% 
C3  150,000  Iron ore  Tubarao to Beilun-Baoshan   15% 
C4  150,000  Coal  Richard’s Bay to Rotterdam   5% 
C5  150,000  Iron ore  West Australia to Beilun-Baoshan   15% 
C7  150,000  Coal  Bolivar to Rotterdam   5% 
C8  
N/A T/C  
Transatlantic round voyage. 
Delivery: Gibraltar-Hamburg  30-45 10% 
C9  
N/A T/C  
Delivery: ARA or passing 
Passero,  
Redelivery: China-Japan  
About 65 5% 
C10  
N/A T/C  
Transpacific round voyage. 
Delivery China-Japan,  30-40 20% 
C11  
N/A T/C  
Delivery: China-Japan, 
Redelivery: ARA or passing 
Passero. 
About 65 5%
C12  150,000  Coal Gladstone to Rotterdam  10% 
Source: Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Securities Ltd, 2007. 
 
The major elements of the time-charter description of the Baltic Capesize are as follows:  
? "built in first class competitive yard" 
? 172,000 mt dwt on draft 17.75 m 
? max. loa 289 m, max beam 45m,  
? 190,000 cbm grain,  
? 14.5L /15.0B on 56 mts fuel oil, no diesel at sea;  
? Non coated. 
? Not ice classed.  
? Special survey passed.  
? Maximum age - 10 years. 
? 2% total commission.  
? Laycan 5/15 days in advance. 
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Figure 22: Mapping of BCI routes 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Note: 
? The width of each represents its weighting within the BCI. 
? Pointed routes are time-charter routes.  
? Circle area corresponds to a range of ports. 
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Table 10: Baltic Exchange Panamax Index Composition 
Route  Ship size 
(DWT) 
Cargo  Route description  Duration 
(days) 
Weightings 
P1A  74,000 T/C  
Transatlantic round voyage. 
Delivery: Skaw-Gibraltar. 
Redelivery: Skaw-Gibraltar. 
50-60 25% 
P2A  74,000 T/C  Delivery: Skaw-Gibraltar.  Redelivery: Taiwan-Japan.  60-65 25% 
P3A  74,000 T/C  Transpacific round voyage. 35-50 25% 
P4 74,000 T/C  Delivery: Japan-Korea. Redelivery: Skaw-Gibraltar. 50-60 25% 
Source: Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Securities Ltd, 2007. 
 
The major elements of the time charter description of the Baltic Panamax are as follows:  
? "built in first class competitive yard"  
? 74,000 mt dwt on draft 13.95 m, 
? 89,000 cbm grain,  
? max. loa 225 m,  
? 14.0 knots on 32L/28B fuel oil and no diesel at sea.  
? Non coated.  
? Not ice classed.  
? Special survey passed. 
? Maximum age - 7 years. 
? 2% total commission.  
? Cargo basis grain, ore, coal, or similar. 
? Laycan 15/25 days in advance. 
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Figure 23: Mapping of BPI routes 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Note: 
? The width of each represents its weighting with the BPI. 
? Circle area corresponds to a range of ports. 
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Table 11: Baltic Exchange Supramax Index composition 
Route Ship 
Size 
(DWT) 
Cargo  Route description Duration 
(days) 
Weightings
S1A  52,454  T/C 
Delivery: Antwerp/Skaw range  
Redelivery: Singapore/Japan range incl. 
China 
60-65 12.5% 
S1B  52,454  T/C  
Delivery passing Canakkale  
Redelivery Singapore/Japan range incl. 
China 
50-55 12.5% 
S2  52,454  T/C  
Trans Pacific round voyage or 
Delivery South Korea/Japan range  
for 1 Australian port  
Redelivery South Korea/Japan range. 
35-40 25% 
S3  52,454  T/C  
Delivery South Korea/Japan range  
Redelivery Gibraltar/Skaw range.  60-65 25% 
S4A  52,454  T/C  
Delivery US Gulf 
Redelivery Skaw-Passero range. 30 12.5%
S4B 52,454 T/C  
Delivery Skaw – Passero range 
Redelivery US Gulf. 30 12.5%
Source: Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Securities Ltd, 2007. 
 
The major elements of the time charter description of the Baltic Supramax are as follows:  
? Standard "Tess 52" type vessel with grabs as follows:  
? 52,454 mt dwt self trimming single deck bulkcarrier on 12.02 m ssw 
? 189.99 m LOA 32.26 m Beam  
? 5 holds / 5 hatches  
? 67,756 cum.grain 65,600 cum.bale 
? 14L /14.5B on 30mt (380 cst) no mdo at sea  
? Cr 4 x 30 mt with 12 cum grabs  
? Maximum age - 10 years 
? 5% commission total 
? Laycan 5/10 days in advance. 
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Figure 24: Mapping of BSI routes 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Note: 
? The width of each represents its weighting with the BPI. 
? Circle area corresponds to a range of ports. 
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Table 12: Baltic Exchange Handysize Index composition 
Route Ship 
Size 
(DWT) 
Cargo  Route description Duration 
(days) 
Weightings
HS1  28,000 T/C 
Delivery: Skaw – Passero range  
Redelivery: Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 
range. 
35 - 45 12.5% 
HS2  28,000 T/C  
Delivery: Skaw - Passero range  
Redelivery: Boston – Galveston range.  35 - 45 12.5% 
HS3  28,000 T/C  
Delivery: Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 
range. 
Redelivery: Skaw – Passero range. 
35-45 12.5% 
HS4  28,000 T/C  
Delivery: US Gulf  
Via US Gulf or NC South America, 
Redelivery: Skaw – Passero range. 
35-45 12.5% 
HS5  28,000 T/C  
Delivery South East Asia. 
Via Australia. 
Redelivery: Singapore – Japan range 
including China.  
25 - 30 25%
HS6 28,000 T/C  
Delivery: South Korea – Japan range. 
Via North Pacific. 
Redelivery: Singapore-Japan range 
including China. 
40 - 45 25%
Source: Baltic Exchange and Clarkson Securities Ltd. 
 
The major elements of the time charter description of the Baltic Handysize are as follows:  
? 28,000 mt dwt self trimming single deck bulkcarrier on 9.78m ssw  
? 5holds/5 hatches.  
? 37,523 c.um grain 35,762 c.um bale  
? 4x 30 t cranes  
? 69m loa 27 m beam. 
? 14 knots on average laden/ballast on 22 mt ifo (380) no diesel at sea.  
? Maximum age  - 15 years  
? 5% total commision 
? Laycan 5/10 days in advance.  
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Figure 25: Mapping of BHSI routes 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Note: 
? The width of each represents its weighting within the BCI. 
? Circle area corresponds to a range of ports. 
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APPENDIX 2: Imarex Trade statistics - Drybulk 
 
Table 13: Imarex trade statistics - Drybulk 
       
Imarex trade 
statictics 
2004 - 
Drybulk 
# 
trades 
# lots Nominal 
trade value 
Avg. 
Lots  
/ 
trades 
Avg. Nom 
value  
/ trade 
Avg. 
Lots / 
trades 
annual 
Aug '04 27 4 013 101 000 000 149 3 740 741 
Sep '04 33 5 741 110 000 000 174 3 336 364 
Oct '04 22 3 711 89 900 000 169 4 086 364 
Nov '04 42 5 386 142 300 000 128 3 388 095 
  
148.20 
Dec '04 29 3 498 103 300 000 121 3 562 069 
   Total (ytd) 560 102 
835
2 292 200 
000     
    
Jan '05 30 4 067 125 200 000 154 4 171 848 
Feb '05 24 2 641 70 700 000 110 2 944 208 
Mar '05 30 3 697 103 780 000 123 3 459 317 
Apr '05 24 4 085 105 600 000 170 4 399 832 
May '05 26 4 125 92 958 000 159 3 575 304 
Jun '05 32 5 414 97 286 000 169 3 040 198 
Jul '05 41 6 021 88 600 000 144 2 215 844 
  
114.42 
Aug '05 38 4 121 69 000 000 108 1 800 000 
Sep '05 79 6 212 117 000 000 79 1 480 000 
Oct '05 71 2 560 52 000000 36 726 000 
Nov '05 130 6 309 99 300 000 49 764 000 
Dec '05 45 3 223 46 000 000 72 1 067 000 
   Total (ytd) 570 52 
475
1 067 424 
000     
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Imarex trade 
statictics 
2006 - 
Drybulk 
# 
trades 
# lots Nominal 
trade value 
Avg. 
Lots  
/ 
trades 
Avg. Nom 
value  
/ trade 
Avg. 
Lots / 
trades 
annual 
    
Jan '06 151 9 292 $131 000 000 62 $870 220 
Feb '06 81 4 459 $ 71 000 000 55 $872 000 
Mar '06 85 4 968 $ 78 000 000 58 $917 000 
Apr '06 41 3 101 $ 48 000 000 76 $1 170 731 
May '06 176 11 
200
$162 820 000 64 $935 747 
Jun '06 102 9 319 $162 648 000 82 $1 594 588 
Jul '06 102 10 
038
$193 965 000 98 $1 901 614 
Aug '06 165 20 
157
$503 873 000 122 $3 053 778 
Sep '06 88 7 485 $224 400 000 165 $2 550 820 
Oct '06 77 5 485 $163 000 000 71 $2 116 883 
Nov '06 142 8 566 $251 000 000 60 $1 767 606 
Dec '06 46 1701 $ 53 000 000 37   
  
79.17 
Total (ytd) 1 256 95 
771
$2 042 706 
000
 
    
    
Jan '07 156 6 172 $183 mill 40 $1.2 mill 
Feb '07 178 9 462 $321 mill 53 $1.8 mill 
Mar '07 134 10 
742
$370 mill 80 $2.7 mill 
Apr '07 92 8 006 $317 mill 87 $3.4 mill 
  
67.60 
May '07 180 14 
111
$520 mill 78 $2 mill 
Source: Imarex 
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APPENDIX 3: Progressive introduction of the daily BFA 
 
Following extracts of the history of the Baltic Exchange, the introduction of the daily 
BFA has been progressive (BFA related to tanker routes has been voluntarily excluded):  
 
2 February 2003 – Trials begin on the Baltic Forward Assessment (BFA), initially for 
Routes P2, P2A and C4 and the panamax four-time charter average. Assessments for the 
routes are on the basis of the current month and one and two months forward, for the 
four timecharter average on the basis of one, two and three quarters forward. 
Assessments are produced on a weekly basis. (Baltic Exchange, 2007a, p. 20) 
 
18 September 2003 –BFA is officially launched. (Baltic Exchange, 2007a, p. 21) 
 
4 February 2004 – BFA assessment for Route P2 ceases. (Baltic Exchange, 2007a, p. 
21) 
 
25 February 2004 – BFA assessment for Route P3A_03 commences (Baltic Exchange, 
2007a, p. 21) 
 
7 May 2004 -The BFA commenced trials on a number of heavily dry and tanker routes 
on a daily basis. On the dry side on routes C4, C7, Capes 4TC, P2A_03, P3A_03, 
Panamax 4TC and Handymax 6TC. (Baltic Exchange, 2007a, p. 23) 
 
01 September 2005 – BFA Reporting Changes.  
C3 & C5 are introduced. The rollover date, for all routes, is now the first working day of 
each month. (Baltic Exchange, 2007a, p. 27) 
APPENDIX 4: Calculation of geographical segmentation 
Table 14: Calculation of geographical segmentation for BCI 
Atlantic   Pacific   Route Shipment  size Cargo Route description Weightings Distance % Distance  % 
C2  
160,000 
Iron 
ore  
Tubarao to Rotterdam  
10%   100%     
C3  
150,000 
Iron 
ore  
Tubarao to Beilun-Baoshan  
15%      3,201 30%      7,438  70% 
C4  150,000 Coal  Richard’s Bay to Rotterdam  5%   100%     
C5  
150,000 
Iron 
ore  
West Australia to Beilun-Baoshan  
15%       100% 
C7  150,000 Coal  Bolivar to Rotterdam  5%   100%     
C8  
  T/C  
Transatlantic round voyage.  
Delivery: Gibraltar-Hamburg 10%   100%     
C9  
  T/C  
Delivery: ARA or passing Passero,  
Redelivery: China-Japan 5%      6,158 43%      8,229  57% 
C10  
  T/C  
Transpacific round voyage. 
Delivery China-Japan, 20%       100% 
C11  
  T/C  
Delivery: China-Japan, Redelivery:  
ARA or passing Passero. 5%      6,158 43%      8,229  57% 
C12  150,000 Coal Gladstone to Rotterdam 10%      6,158 46%      7,157  54% 
Source: Author    Atlantic 43% Pacific 57% 
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Table 15: Calculation of geographical segmentation for BPI 
      
Atlantic   Pacific   Route  Cargo Route description  Weightings 
Distance % Distance  % 
P1A  T/C  
Transatlantic round voyage. Delivery: Skaw-
Gibraltar. Redelivery: Skaw-Gibraltar. 25%   100%     
P2A  T/C  
Delivery: Skaw-Gibraltar.  
Redelivery: Taiwan-Japan.  25%      6,540 44%      8,229  56% 
P3A  T/C  Transpacific round voyage. 25%       100% 
P4 T/C  
Delivery: Japan-Korea. Redelivery: Skaw-
Gibraltar. 25%      6,540 44%      8,229  56% 
Source: Author    Atlantic 47% Pacific 53% 
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Table 16: Calculation of geographical segmentation for BSI 
Shipment Atlantic   Pacific   Route 
Size 
Cargo  Route description Weightings
Distance % Distance % 
Delivery: Antwerp/Skaw range  
S1A  52,454 T/C 
Redelivery:Singapore/Japan range incl. China 
12.50%      3,732 32%      7,784 68% 
Delivery passing Canakkale  
S1B  52,454 T/C  
Redelivery Singapore/Japan range incl. China 
12.50%         731 9%      7,784 91% 
S2  52,454 T/C  Trans Pacific round voyage or 25%    100% 
Delivery South Korea/Japan range  
S3  52,454 T/C  Redelivery Gibraltar/Skaw range.  25%      3,732 32%      7,784 68% 
Delivery US Gulf 
S4A  52,454 T/C  Redelivery Skaw-Passero range. 12.50%  100%    
Delivery Skaw – Passero range 
S4B 52,454 T/C  Redelivery US Gulf. 12.50%  100%    
Source: Author    Atlantic 38% Pacific 62% 
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Table 17: Calculation of geographical segmentation for BHSI and BDI 
Shipment Atlantic   Pacific   Route 
Size 
Cargo  Route description Weightings
Distance % Distance % 
HS1    T/C Delivery: Skaw – Passero range  
      Redelivery: Recalada – Rio de Janeiro range. 12.50%   100%     
HS2    T/C  Delivery: Skaw - Passero range  
      Redelivery: Boston – Galveston range.  12.50%   100%     
HS3    T/C  Delivery: Recalada – Rio de Janeiro range. 
      Redelivery: Skaw – Passero range. 12.50%   100%     
HS4    T/C  Delivery: US Gulf  
      Via US Gulf or NC South America, 
      Redelivery: Skaw – Passero range. 
12.50%   100%     
HS5    T/C  Delivery South East Asia. 
      Via Australia. 
      Redelivery: Singapore – Japan range including China.  
25%       100% 
HS6   T/C  Delivery: South Korea – Japan range. 
      Via North Pacific. 
      Redelivery: Singapore-Japan range  
including China. 25%       100% 
Source: Author    Atlantic 50% Pacific 50% 
    Total BDI Atlantic 45% 55% Pacific 
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